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It is widely cited that cyber attacks have become more prevalent on a
global scale. In light of this, the cybercrime industry has been established for
various purposes such as political, economic and socio-cultural aims. Such
attacks can be used as a harmful weapon and cyberspace is often cited as
a battlefield. One of the most serious types of cyber attacks is the Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat (APT), which is a new and more complex version
of multi-step attack. The main aim of the APT attack is espionage and
data exfiltration, which has the potential to cause significant damage and
substantial financial loss.
This research aims to develop a novel system to detect and predict APT
attacks. A Machine-Learning-based APT detection system, called MLAPT,
is proposed. MLAPT runs through three main phases: (1) Threat detection,
in which eight methods are developed to detect different techniques used
during the various APT steps. The implementation and validation of these
methods with real traffic is a significant contribution to the current body of
research; (2) Alert correlation, in which a correlation framework is designed
to link the outputs of the detection methods, aiming to find alerts that could
be related and belong to one APT scenario; and (3) Attack prediction, in
which a machine-learning-based prediction module is proposed based on the
correlation framework output, to be used by the network security team to
determine the probability of the early alerts to develop a complete APT at-
tack. The correlation framework and prediction module are two other major
contributions in this work. MLAPT is experimentally evaluated and the
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The World Wide Web is everywhere with a presently estimated size of
roughly 46.4 billion web pages, as indexed by Google engine [2]. The Inter-
net has developed from a system providing a local connection service dealing
with simple documents to what is currently a robust and adaptable platform
used to spread information and deliver applications. Furthermore, organisa-
tions and corporations have increasingly depended on the Internet sharing
significant information online. However, with this evolution of the Internet,
the number of cyber attacks have rapidly increased. Cybercrime has become
more prevalent because it can be launched from outside the target’s network
and, in many cases, it is difficult to identify the attacker [3]. As a result,
attackers have become organised and a cybercrime industry has been es-
tablished for various purposes such as political, economic and socio-cultural
aims [4]. Moreover, cyber attacks can be used to spy on governments; thus,





The annual cost of cyber attacks was $3 trillion in 2015. Moreover, it is
expected to increase to more than $6 trillion per annum by 2021 [6]. This
expensive cost has brought much interest in the research and investment to-
wards developing new methods and techniques for cyber attacks defence. For
this reason, intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) [7], explored
later in Section 2.2 on page 16, have been suggested to be used to protect
computer networks and mitigate this threat.
Although virus scanners, firewalls and IDPSs have been able to detect
and prevent many of cyber attacks, cyber-criminals in turn have developed
more advanced methods and techniques to intrude into the target’s network
and exploit its resources. In addition, many of the defence approaches as-
sume that if the organisations’ defences are too hard to breach, the attacker
will try to find an easier victim. Nonetheless, according to a technical report
by Trend Micro [8], this assumption is no longer valid with the rise of tar-
geted attacks, also known as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), in which
both cyber-criminals and hackers are targeting selected organizations and
persisting until they achieve their goals.
The APT attack, explained further in Section 2.1 on page 13, is target-
ing a specific organisation and it is performed through several steps. The
main aim of APT is espionage and then data exfiltration. Therefore, APT is
considered as a new and more complex version of multi-step attack [9]. These
APTs form a problem for current detection methods as they use advanced
techniques like social engineering [10] and make use of unknown vulnera-
bilities. Moreover, the economic damages due to a successful APT attack
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can be very expensive. The expected cost of attacks is the major motiva-
tion for the investments in intrusion detection and prevention systems [11].
APTs are currently one of the most serious threats to the companies and
governments [12].
Most of the research in the area of APT detection, as explored later
in Chapter 3 on page 35, has focused on analysing already identified
APTs [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19], or detecting a particular APT that
uses a specific piece of malware [20]. Some works have attempted to detect
potential APT attacks. However, they face serious shortcomings in achieving
real time detection [21], detecting all APT attack steps [21], balance between
false positive and false negative rates [20], and correlating of events spanning
over a long period of time [22] [23]. Therefore, it is assumed that there is a
need to research new approaches and techniques regarding the APT attacks
detection.
1.2 Research Questions
This research aims to develop a novel system to detect and predict APT
attacks which can make a significant contribution to intrusion detection sys-
tems. The effectiveness of the proposed approach, which is its ability to
detect APT attacks, should be high. This should be combined with high
accuracy resulting into a low number of false warnings. This motivates the
first research question:
Research question 1: How to develop an efficient system to detect the
APT attack in a systematic way?
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The detection system should support the real time detection because if
an attack (or an attempted attack) is detected quickly, it can be much easier
to trace back to the attacker, minimise the damage and prevent further
break-ins. This motivates the second research question:
Research question 2: How effective is the developed system in terms of
the processing speed?
Detecting the APT attack before completing its life cycle can prevent
the attackers from achieving their goals and stealing the data. This motivates
the third research question:
Research question 3: How good is the developed system in terms of the
prediction of the APT attack in its early steps?
The main objective of this thesis is to answer the research questions.
1.3 Contributions
To answer the first research question, a machine-learning-based APT detec-
tion system, called MLAPT, has been developed. MLAPT runs through
three main phases: threat detection, alert correlation and attack prediction.
In the first phase, the sniffed data traffic is scanned to detect possible tech-
niques used in the APT attack life cycle. To this end, eight detection modules
have been developed and tested; each module implements a method to detect
one technique used in one of the APT attack steps. These detection mod-
ules are as follows: disguised exe file detection (DeFD), malicious file hash
detection (MFHD), malicious domain name detection (MDND), malicious
IP address detection (MIPD), malicious SSL certificate detection (MSSLD),
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domain flux detection (DFD), scan detection (SD), and Tor connection de-
tection (TorCD). The output of this phase is alerts, also known as events,
triggered by the individual modules. In the second phase, the alerts raised
by the individual detection modules are fed to the newly designed (FCI) cor-
relation framework. The aim of the correlation framework is to find alerts
which could be related and belong to one APT attack scenario. The process
in this phase undergoes three main steps: alerts filter (AF), to identify redun-
dant or repeated alerts; clustering of alerts (AC), which most likely belong
to the same APT attack scenario; and correlation indexing (CI), to evaluate
the degree of correlation between alerts of each cluster. The main objec-
tive of using the correlation framework is to reduce the false positive rate of
the MLAPT detection system. In the final phase, a machine-learning-based
prediction module (PM) is designed and implemented based on a historical
record of the monitored network. This module can be used by the network
security team to determine the probability of the early alerts to develop a
complete APT attack.
To answer the second research question, MLAPT has been developed
in such a way that all the modules and algorithms in the first and second
phases do not depend on storing the data and then analysing it, instead,
those modules and algorithms are able to process the network traffic in real
time and generate their outputs (events) accordingly.
To answer the third research question, a prediction module, which uses
a historical record of the monitored network and applies machine learning
techniques, has been developed. This module allows the network security
team to predict the APT attack in its early steps and apply the required
procedure to stop it before the attack completes its life cycle.
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Although the detection modules methodologies exist in the literature,
their implementation and validation in real traffic are significant contribu-
tions to the field. The correlation framework and prediction module are two
other major contributions in this thesis.
The thesis results and contributions have been published in the following
journals and conference proceedings:
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Mohammad Hammoudeh, Vaclav Prenosil, Liangxiu
Han and Robert Hegarty. MLAPT: A Correlation-Based System for
Real-Time Advanced Persistent Threat Detection and Prediction. Jour-
nal paper, under review.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Vaclav Prenosil, Mohammad Hammoudeh and Umar
Raza. Malicious SSL Certificate Detection: A Step Towards Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat Defence. In Proceedings of International
Conference on Future Networks and Distributed Systems. Cambridge,
United Kingdom: ACM Digital Library, 2017. ISBN 978-1-4503-4844-
7. doi:10.475/123_4.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Vaclav Prenosil, and Mohammad Hammoudeh. Botnet
Command and Control Traffic Detection Challenges: A Correlation-
based Solution. International Journal of Advances in Computer Net-
works and Its Security (IJCNS), New York, USA: theIRED, 2017, vol.
7, Issue 2, p. 27-31. ISSN 2250-3757.
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∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Vaclav Prenosil, Ahmad Alhejailan and Mohammad
Hammoudeh. Social Engineering Attack Strategies and Defence Ap-
proaches. In Proceedings of International Conference on Future In-
ternet of Things and Cloud. Vienna, Austria: IEEE Xplore Dig-
ital Library, 2016. p. 145-149, 5 pp. ISBN 978-1-5090-4052-0.
doi:10.1109/FiCloud.2016.28.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Vaclav Prenosil, Jakub Svoboda and Mohammad
Hammoudeh. A Survey on Network Security Monitoring Systems.
In Proceedings of International Conference on Future Internet of
Things and Cloud. Vienna, Austria: IEEE Xplore Digital Library,
2016. p. 77-82, 6 pp. ISBN 978-1-5090-3946-3. doi:10.1109/W-
FiCloud.2016.30.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. Malicious File Hash Detection
and Drive-by Download Attacks. In Suresh Chandra Satapathy, K.
Srujan Raju, Jyotsna Kumar Mandal, Vikrant Bhateja. Proceedings of
the Second International Conference on Computer and Communication
Technologies, series Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing.
Hyderabad: Springer, 2016. p. 661-669, 9 pp. Vol. 379. ISBN 978-81-
322-2516-4. doi:10.1007/978-81-322-2517-1_63.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. Proposed Approach for Tar-
geted Attacks Detection. In Sulaiman, H.A., Othman, M.A., Othman,
M.F.I., Rahim, Y.A., Pee, N.C.. Advanced Computer and Communica-
tion Engineering Technology, Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering.
Phuket: Springer International Publishing, 2016. p. 73-80, 9 pp. Vol.
362. ISBN 978-3-319-24582-9. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24584-3.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Jakub Svoboda, Vaclav Prenosil. A Survey on Bot-
net Command and Control Traffic Detection. International Journal of
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Advances in Computer Networks and Its Security (IJCNS), New York,
USA: theIRED, 2015, vol. 5, Issue 2, p. 75-80. ISSN 2250-3757.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. Advanced Persistent Threat and
Spear Phishing Emails. In Proceedings of International Conference
Distance Learning, Simulation and Communication. Brno, Czech Re-
public: University of Defence, 2015. p. 34-41, 8 pp. ISBN: 978-80-
7231-992-3.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. Blacklist-based Malicious IP
Traffic Detection. In Proceedings of Global Conference on Commu-
nication Technologies (GCCT). Thuckalay, India: IEEE Xplore Dig-
ital Library, 2015. p. 229-233, 5 pp. ISBN 978-1-4799-8552-4.
doi:10.1109/GCCT.2015.7342657.
∙ Jakub Svoboda, Ibrahim Ghafir, Vaclav Prenosil. Network Monitoring
Approaches: An Overview. International Journal of Advances in Com-
puter Networks and Its Security (IJCNS), New York, USA: theIRED,
2015, vol. 5, Issue 2, p. 88-93. ISSN 2250-3757.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. DNS traffic analysis for malicious
domains detection. In Proceedings of International Conference on Sig-
nal Processing and Integrated networks. Noida, India: IEEE Xplore
Digital Library, 2015. p. 613 - 618, 6 pp. ISBN 978-1-4799-5990-7.
doi:10.1109/SPIN.2015.7095337.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. Advanced Persistent Threat At-
tack Detection: An Overview. International Journal of Advances
in Computer Networks and Its Security (IJCNS), New York, USA:
theIRED, 2014, Volume 4, Issue 4, p. 50-54. ISSN: 2250-3757.
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∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. DNS query failure and algorithmi-
cally generated domain-flux detection. In Proceedings of International
Conference on Frontiers of Communications, Networks and Applica-
tions. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IEEE Xplore Digital Library, 2014.
p. 1-5, 5 pp. ISBN 978-1-78561-072-1. doi:10.1049/cp.2014.1410.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Jakub Svoboda and Vaclav Prenosil. Tor-based mal-
ware and Tor connection detection. In Proceedings of International
Conference on Frontiers of Communications, Networks and Applica-
tions. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IEEE Xplore Digital Library, 2014.
p. 1-6, 6 pp. ISBN 978-1-78561-072-1. doi:10.1049/cp.2014.1411.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir, Martin Husak and Vaclav Prenosil. A Survey on In-
trusion Detection and Prevention Systems. In Proceedings of student
conference Zv̊ule 2014, IEEE/UREL. Zv̊ule, Czech Republic: Faculty
of Electrical Engineering and Communication, Brno University of Tech-
nology, 2014. p. 10-14, 5 pp. ISBN 978-80-214-5005-9.
∙ Ibrahim Ghafir and Vaclav Prenosil. POSTER: Network-based Ad-
vanced Persistent Threat Attack Detection. In 8th International Con-
ference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security
(AIMS). 2014.
1.4 Restrictions
The detection modules, in the first phase of MLAPT, are able to detect the
most common techniques possibly used in the APT attack life cycle. If a
new technique is used in the future in one of the APT steps, MLAPT will
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not be able to detect the corresponded step. However, MLAPT will still able
to detect part of the APT attack scenario based on the other steps.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the reader with an overview of the background
of this research. The advanced persistent threat (APT) attack is defined
and the steps of this attack are explained. Besides, the intrusion detection
and prevention systems (IDPSs) are explored. In addition, machine learning
(ML) categories and some approaches are presented.
Chapter 3 explores the state of the art for the APT attack detection.
This chapter introduces previous research findings on APTs and describes
current attempts for the APT attacks detection.
Chapter 4 presents the proposed Machine-Learning-based APT detec-
tion system (MLAPT). The architecture of MLAPT is introduced first, along
with a brief definition of the three main phases of MLAPT: threat detection,
alert correlation and attack prediction. Following this, more description and
details regarding each MLAPT phase are given.
Chapter 5 explains the implementation of MLAPT and mentions to
all frameworks, tools and programming languages used for this implemen-
tation. As MLAPT consists of three main phases: Detection, Correlation,
and Prediction; the implementation algorithms of each phase are presented
separately.
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Chapter 6 introduces the evaluation of MLAPT and presents the re-
sults achieved. Additionally, a comparison between the developed system
MLAPT and other existing systems is provided.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and summarises the achievements. Fur-




This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the background of
this research. The advanced persistent threat (APT) attack is defined and
the steps of this attack are explained. Besides, the intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDPSs) are explored. In addition, machine learning
(ML) categories and some approaches are presented.
2.1 An Overview of the APT Life Cycle
APT refers to Advanced Persistent Threat. APTs are a cybercrime cate-
gory directed at business and political targets. APTs require a high degree
of stealth over a long period of operation in order to be successful. The
attacker usually aims for more than immediate financial gain, and infected
systems continue to be compromised even after the target’s network has been



















Figure 2.1: Typical steps of the APT attack [1].
1. Intelligence gathering: This initial step aims to get information regard-
ing the target, like its organizational structure, IT environment and
even about people who are working for that target. For this purpose,
the attacker can use public sources (LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, etc)
and prepare a customized attack. Through this step the attacker tries
to find and organize accomplices, build or acquire tools, and research
target/infrastructure/employees.
2. Initial compromise (Point of entry): Performed by use of social en-
gineering and spear phishing, over email, using software vulnerabili-
ties [25]. Another popular infection method is planting malware on a
website which the victim employees will be likely to visit.
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3. Command and control (C&C) communication: After an organization’s
perimeter has been breached, continuous communication between the
infected host and the C&C server should be preserved to instruct and
guide the compromised machine. These communications are usually
protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption, making it difficult
to identify if the traffic directed to sites is malicious. Another technique
can be used in this step is domain flux technique [26]; an exploited
host may try to connect to a large number of domain names which are
expected to be C&C servers. The goal of this technique is to make it
difficult or even impossible to shut down all of these domain names.
4. Lateral movement: Once getting access to the target’s network, the
attacker laterally moves throughout the target’s network searching for
new hosts to infect. The attacker can use brute force attack [27], to
obtain information such as a user password or personal identification
number (PIN); an automated software is used to generate a large num-
ber of consecutive guesses as to the value of the desired data. Another
technique is pass the hash attack [28], in which the attacker steals a
hashed user credential and, without cracking it, reuses it to trick an
authentication system into creating a new authenticated session on the
same network.
5. Asset/Data discovery: This step aims to identify and isolate the note-
worthy assets within the target’s network for future data exfiltration.
Port scanning can be used for this step [29].
6. Data exfiltration: Data of interest is transmitted into external servers
which are controlled by the attacker. There are some techniques used
for data exfiltration like built-in file transfer, via FTP or HTTP and
via the Tor anonymity network [30].
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2.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Sys-
tems (IDPS)
IDPSs are used to monitor different systems and use various approaches to
detect intrusions to the monitored systems. These intrusions can result from
external/internal attacks or misuse by the system users. Figure 2.2 shows








Figure 2.2: The general architecture of the IDPS.
This general architecture consists of four main blocks: event block,
database block, analysis block and response block. First, the events of the
monitored system are collected by the event block, then the events are sent
to the database block to be stored. Following this, the stored events are
processed by the the analysis block and an alert can be sent to the response
block, which aims to respond to the malicious activity and stop it [31].
Different approaches are followed for IDPS, among them, four method-
ologies are widely used. These are the anomaly based, signature based,
stateful protocol analysis based and hybrid based. The last methodology, the
hybrid base, is a combination of the other ones and provides better perfor-
mance capabilities; thus, it is mostly used by the present intrusion detection
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systems. Despite having the same general model, the four methodologies are
different in the way of processing the events collected from the monitored
system. The main purpose of all methodologies is to detect if a breach into
the monitored system has occurred [32].
2.2.1 Anomaly Based Methodology
This methodology is based on a comparison between the monitored activity
and a baseline profile. The baseline profile is built within the training phase,
in this phase the IDPS monitors the normal behaviour of the system and
learns the environment to develop the baseline profile. The baseline profile
can be built for systems, networks, users and so on. This profile can be fixed
or dynamic. When the fixed profile is built, it does not change; While the
dynamic profile changes when the monitored system changes. Building a
dynamic profile requires the IDPS to keep updating the profile which adds
more load to the system, moreover, this makes the system available to the
evasion. To evade an IDPS uses a dynamic profile, the attacker can perform
the attack over a long period of time; when building the profile, the IDPS
combines the malicious activities with the profile and considers them as
normal system changes [33].
In the detection phase, a threshold is set and any deviations for the
monitored activities from the baseline profile are considered as malicious.
Anomaly based methodologies are effective at detecting previously unknown
attacks, known as zero-day attacks, without any updates to the system.
Three main techniques are used by anomaly IDPSs: knowledge/data-mining,
machine learning based and statistical anomaly detection [34].
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Figure 2.3 shows the general architecture of an anomaly based IDPS.
A detector is used to observe the monitored environment, the IDPS then
compares the monitored activity against a baseline profile. If the monitored
activity matches the baseline profile, that means, it is a normal activity and
no action is required to be taken. If a deviation from the baseline is found,
the IDPS checks the predefined threshold: if the deviation is within the
threshold range, the IDPS updates the baseline profile; if the deviation is
out of the threshold range, the monitored activity is reported as a malicious












Figure 2.3: The general architecture of an anomaly based IDPS.
2.2.2 Signature Based Methodology
This methodology is based on a comparison between the monitored system
signatures and a signatures database. This database contains a list of known
attack signatures. If a match is found, the monitored system signature is
reported as a malicious one and an alert is raised. The signature based
methodology does not require a deep inspection for each single environment
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activity or every packet in the network traffic, and it only looks for known
signatures in the database. Therefore, signature based IDPS does not add
extra load to the system [35]. As the signature based IDPS does not require
a baseline profile, there is no need for the training phase used the anomaly
based IDPS. Thus, the signature based IDPS is easy to be deployed and put
directly in the detection phase. This methodology is very effective at detect-
ing previously known attacks as their signatures are known and included in
the signatures database. However, zero-day attacks cannot be detected as
their signatures are not known yet [36].
Figure 2.4 shows the general architecture of a signature based IDPS. A
detector is used by the IDPS to monitor the system signatures, the IDPS
then compares the captured signatures with the signatures database: if a
match is found, the monitored signature is reported as an attack and an










Figure 2.4: The general architecture of a signature based IDPS.
Since the signature based IDPS depends on the signatures database
which contains known attacks and it is not possible to detect the new attacks
before updating the database and adding the new signatures, this makes the
IDPS open to the evasion. The attacker can amend the known attack and
target a system which has an outdated database, in doing so, the attacker
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can avoid the IDPS as the modified attack is considered as a new one. For
this reason, the signature based IDPS requires to be updated continuously
based on significant intelligence feeds which provide the IDPS with the new
attacks [37].
2.2.3 Stateful Protocol Analysis Based Methodology
The stateful protocol analysis methodology is based on a comparison between
the monitored behaviour and a protocol database. The protocol database
contains profiles of how protocols should behave. The protocol profiles are
created and built by the vendors. While the signature based IDPS only
matches the monitored behaviour against a list of signatures, the stateful
protocol analysis based IDPS has a comprehensive understanding of the
protocol behaviour and performs a deep analysis of the interactions between
the protocols and applications. This makes the stateful protocol analysis
methodology add extra overhead to the system [38].
Figure 2.5 shows the general architecture of the stateful protocol anal-
ysis based IDPS. This architecture is similar to that of the signature based
IDPS. A detector is used by the IDPS to monitor the system behaviour, the
IDPS then compares the observed behaviour with the protocols database:
if the observed behaviour does not meet the expected protocol behaviour,
the monitored behaviour is reported as an attack and an alert is raised; if
the observed behaviour meets the expected protocol behaviour, no action is
required to be taken [31].
In spite of the fact that this methodology has a comprehensive under-
standing of how protocols should behave, the stateful protocol analysis based














Figure 2.5: The general architecture of a stateful protocol analysis based
IDPS.
stay within the expected behaviour of the protocols, in doing so, the at-
tacker can bypass the IDPS. Over the last decade, stateful protocol analysis
methodology has not been used alone for the IDPS. This methodology has
been integrated and combined with the other IDPS methodologies. Most of
the IDPSs depend on the anomaly, signature, and hybrid techniques. Thus,
the stateful protocol analysis is not used any more as a standalone IDPS
methodology [39].
2.2.4 Hybrid Based Methodology
To get the advantages of more than one methodology, a combination between
two or more methodologies is used, this leads to a better technique, known
as hybrid based methodology. The hybrid based IDPS is able to detect more
malicious activities than each individual methodology alone [40].
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Figure 2.6 shows the general architecture of a hybrid based IDPS. The
monitored environment is processed and analysed by the three methodologies








Figure 2.6: The general architecture of a hybrid based IDPS.
2.3 Machine Learning
Usually computers are programmed to perform their functions, while in ma-
chine learning systems, computers can learn without being obviously pro-
grammed. Machine learning gives computer programs the ability to develop
themselves when the environment changes or new data comes. For this rea-
son, machine learning is considered as a type of artificial intelligence (AI) [41].
Machine learning analyses the data with the aim of finding patterns and ex-
tracting program functions accordingly. The main task of machine learning
is to find models. The model should represent the data and describe the
main function of the system [42].
Based on the way how the model is built, machine learning is classified
into four main categories: (1) supervised learning [43], when the dataset
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includes the predictor features which are all labelled; (2) unsupervised learn-
ing [44], when the dataset includes the predictor features but does not include
the labels; (3) semi-supervised learning [45], when the dataset includes the
predictor features in which some of them have labels, while some are not
labelled; and (4) reinforcement learning [46], which provides machines and
software agents with the ability to automatically make the best decision
within a given environment.
2.3.1 Machine Learning Approaches
Many approaches are used for machine learning [47]. This section presents
only the ones used in this research, mainly for the purpose of data classifi-
cation.
2.3.1.1 Decision Tree Learning
Decision tree is one of the supervised learning models, in which the final
decision is made through a sequence of internal functions. A decision tree
includes inner nodes and final leaves. The inner node performs a specific
function to decide which branch to follow to the next inner node, and so on
until a leaf node is reached and the final decision is made [48].
Table 2.1 shows an example of a training dataset and its decision tree
is shown in Figure 2.7. The nodes in the decision tree represents the dataset
attributes 𝑎𝑡1, 𝑎𝑡2, 𝑎𝑡3 and 𝑎𝑡4; the decision tree branches are formed based
on the attributes values 𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2, 𝑎3, 𝑏3, 𝑎4 and 𝑏4; and the
terminal leaves in the decision tree indicates the dataset classes 𝑌 𝑒𝑠 and
𝑁𝑜 [49].
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Table 2.1: An example of a training dataset.
𝑎𝑡1 𝑎𝑡2 𝑎𝑡3 𝑎𝑡4 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑎4 Yes
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑏4 Yes
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑎4 Yes
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑏3 𝑏4 No
𝑎1 𝑐2 𝑎3 𝑎4 Yes
𝑎1 𝑐2 𝑎3 𝑏4 No
𝑏1 𝑏2 𝑏3 𝑏4 No
𝑐1 𝑏2 𝑏3 𝑏4 No
Figure 2.7: An example of a decision tree.
The decision tree process consists of two main phases: the first one is
the growth phase. This phase includes a recursive dividing of the dataset
until creating a decision tree in which each node is related to one class or
more dividing to the node results in other nodes, which do not go over a
specific threshold. The second phase is the pruning phase. The purpose of
this phase is to prevent the over-fitting of the training dataset by creating
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a sub-tree, in other word, this phase works on generalizing the decision tree
which was generated in the growth phase. The process in the second phase is
known as post-pruning, while it is called pre-pruning in the first phase [50].
The decision tree algorithm applies a discrete function on the input at-
tributes to decide regarding partitioning the dataset. That function is chosen
based on some partitioning measures such as Gini impurity, Information gain
and Variance reduction.
Gini impurity is a measure of misclassification, which applies in a multi-
class classifier context. Gini coefficient applies to binary classification and
requires a classifier that can in some way rank examples according to the
likelihood of being in a positive class [51]. For a given set of items with
𝐽 classes, 𝑓𝑖 is the fraction of items labelled with class i in the set, where




















Information gain is equal to the total entropy for an attribute if for
each of the attribute values a unique classification can be made for the result
attribute [52]. The Information gain 𝐼𝐺(𝑇, 𝑎) for a given attribute 𝑎 in a
training set 𝑇 , is based on the concept of entropy 𝐻(𝑇 ), given as:
𝐻(𝑇 ) = −
𝐽∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑝𝑖 log2 𝑝𝑖 (2.3)
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Where 𝑝1, 𝑝2, ..., 𝑝𝑛 are fractions represent the percentage of each class
presented in the child node which results from a split in the tree.




|{x ∈ 𝑇 |𝑥𝑎 = 𝑣}|
|𝑇 |
·𝐻({x ∈ 𝑇 |𝑥𝑎 = 𝑣}) (2.5)
Where each of the form (𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, ..., 𝑥𝑘, 𝑦), 𝑥𝑎 ∈ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠(𝑎) is the
value of the 𝑎 attribute of example 𝑥, 𝑦 is the corresponding class label.
Variance reduction is the search for alternative and more accurate es-
timators of a given quantity. Simple variance reduction methods often are
remarkably effective and easy to implement [53]. The variance reduction of a
node 𝑁 is defined as the total reduction of the variance of the target variable





























Where 𝑆 is the set of pre-split sample indices, 𝑆𝑡 is the set of sample indices
for which the split test is true, and 𝑆𝑓 is the set of sample indices for which
the split test is false.
The algorithm continues splitting the set into subsets until no split meets
the splitting measure or a stopping feature is reached. The main task of the
decision tree algorithm is to determine the best split, this split divides the
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dataset into two or more subsets which includes one, two or more classes.
The best subset is the one which contains only one class and it is known a
pure subset, otherwise it is impure [54].
2.3.1.2 Support Vector Machines
In Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm, a hyperplane is created to
represent the feature points in the space. This hyperplane splits the feature
points into different categories. The last hyperplane state is specified by the
support vectors which are the most representative points in the boundaries.
The final hyperplane should represent the best distance between support
vectors and the space categories. Thus the final hyperplane classify the
points and divide the space into different regions [55].
For classification tasks, the kernel trick method [56] is used by SVM
algorithms to allow the use of multidimensional hyperplanes. By using these
hyperplanes, SVM learners can process multivariate data for classification
purposes [57].
For a given data (xi, 𝑦𝑖), for 𝑖 = 1, ...𝑚, where 𝑚 is the total number
of samples, xi ∈ 𝜒 ⊆ R𝑑 is the input of sensor readings and 𝑦𝑖 ∈
{+1,-1} represent each of the labels. This model learns from data to find a
hyperplane function such as:
𝑓(𝑥) = wTx + 𝑏 (2.7)
where 𝑓(𝑥) represents the plane as a function of the training samples x, 𝑏
is the bias term and wT is the weight vector. In order to learn the model
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parameters 𝑏 and w, the following function should be optimised:
1
2
||𝑤||2, 𝑠.𝑡. 𝑦𝑖(𝑤𝑇xi + 𝑏) ≥ 1 (2.8)
















When the last equation is solved using quadratic programming, returns a
matrix of 𝛼 coefficients for each xi. Substituting the values in 𝛼 into one
of the Lagrangian constraints the value for w and for the bias term 𝑏 can
be solved. Besides, 𝛼 matrix includes zero and non-zero coefficients. The
non-zero values indicates the support vectors, mentioned above, which are
the feature points in the space which create the hyperplane [58].
SVM can split the non-linear points using the kernel method resulting
in an output similar to that one of a linear model. This method gives SVM
algorithm the feature of flexibility and the ability to handle more complex
data. However, the kernel method adds more computational cost due to the
increased complexity of the quadratic programming optimisation [59].
2.3.1.3 k-Nearest Neighbours
k-Nearest Neighbours (kNN) is a simple machine learning approach used
for pattern recognition either for classification or regression. The 𝑘 closest
samples to the test object in the feature space are selected as an input,
where 𝑘 is a positive integer. The result is based on the use purpose: For
classification purpose, the algorithm process returns a class. The decision is
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based on a voting among the 𝑘 closest samples to the object, when 𝑘 = 1, the
object is then classified into the same category of that single closest sample.
For regression purpose, the algorithm process returns a property value. The
result is based on the average value of the 𝑘 closest samples values [60].
In kNN algorithms, a weight can be added to the participation of each
neighbour. In doing so, the closer samples participates more to the final
decision than the farther ones. Usually a weight of 1/𝑑 is assigned to each
neighbour, where 𝑑 is the distance between the object and the neighbour [61].
In spite of the fact that no training dataset is clearly needed for kNN algo-
rithms, the 𝑘 nearest neighbours can be considered as a training set. In kNN
classification, the classes of the selected neighbours are known, and so on for
the property values in kNN regression.
Figure 2.8 shows an example of kNN classification. This examples in-
cludes two classes: the first one is represented by the blue squares and the
second class is represented by the red triangles. The kNN task is to classify
the object represented by the green circle either to the first or second class.
The value of 𝑘 plays a significant role in the final decision. When 𝑘 = 3,
based on the voting among the three nearest neighbours (inside the solid
line circle), the object is classified as a red triangle. However, when 𝑘 = 5,
based on the voting among the five nearest neighbours (inside the dashed
line circle), the object is classified as a blue square [62].
Many distance measures are used in kNN algorithms, the most common
one is the Euclidean distance [63]. For given points 𝑥 and 𝑦, where 𝑥 =
(𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑛) and 𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, ..., 𝑦𝑛), the Euclidean distance is calculated as
follows:
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Figure 2.8: An example of kNN classification.
d(x,y) = d(y,x) =
√︀




(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖)2 (2.11)
Some other distance measures used in kNN algorithms are: Hamming
distance [64], Manhattan distance [65] and Minkowski distance [66].
2.3.1.4 Ensemble Learning
Ensemble learning is to combine more than one machine learning (ML) ap-
proach to learn the model. The final decision of the model is made based
on the outputs of all ML approaches involved in the process. The need for
ensemble learning comes from the fact that, in real-word practice, there is
no optimal approach and each one has its own limitations. Thus, ensemble
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learning makes use of the strengths and manage the weaknesses of each ap-
proach resulting in the best model which is able to make the best decision
overall. The model built by ensemble learning has better accuracy than any
other individual contributed approach [67].
Many methods are used to combine the outputs of ML approaches, the
most commonly used ones are: the linear combiner, the product combiner
and the voting combiner. The three methods are not complex and have pre-
sented good results in handling with different problems. However, a specific
combiner can be used for a particular problem [68].
The linear combiner can be used to get the class probability estimates for
both regression and classification models. However the models output should
be real-valued numbers. For a given model 𝑓𝑡(𝑦|𝑥), for a set of 𝑡 = {1...𝑇},





Where 𝑤𝑡 is the weight, the simple probability estimate is when 𝑤𝑡 = 1/𝑇 .







Where 𝑍 is a normalization factor to ensure 𝑓 is a valid distribution.
As previously mentioned, the linear and product combiners are used
only when the models outputs are real-valued numbers. Nonetheless, when
the models outputs are class labels, the voting combiner can be used. Each
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individual model votes for a specific class and the ensemble model select the







Where 𝑡 = {1...𝑇}, 𝑗 = {1...𝐶}; 𝑇 is the number of classifiers and 𝐶 is the
number of classes; 𝑑𝑡,𝑗 ∈ {1, 0} based on the classifier 𝑡 if it selects 𝑗 or not.
2.4 Threat Projection and Impact Assessment
Threat projection and impact assessment have similar, if not the same, in-
terpretation in the fusion community. Two different fusion tasks can be
considered, the first one is threat projection, which focuses on predicting
future attack actions, i.e. where in the network will be attacked and what
exploit(s) will be executed? The second task is impact assessment, which
may be interpreted as estimating damages caused by current and future at-
tack actions. Estimating damages or effects of attack actions on a network
clearly depends on network contexts, some of which may not be automati-
cally gathered, such as the criticality of a machine (due to data stored or its
operational role) in the network. Damages to be caused by future actions
also depend on threat projection [69].
2.5 Summary
This chapter presents an overview of advanced persistent threat (APT),
intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) and machine learning
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(ML). APT is a new and more complex version of known multi-step attack,
usually directed at business and political targets.
IDPSs are used to detect intrusions to the monitored systems using
different methodologies such as: (1) anomaly based methodology, which is
based on a comparison between the monitored activity and a baseline profile;
(2) signature based methodology, which is based on a comparison between
the monitored system signatures and a signatures database; (3) stateful pro-
tocol analysis based methodology, which is based on a comparison between
the monitored behaviour and a protocol database; and (4) hybrid based
methodology, which is a combination between two or more methodologies.
Machine learning gives the computers the ability to learn without being
explicitly programmed. Some of ML approaches, used in this research, are
described such as: (1) decision tree learning, in which the final decision is
made through a sequence of internal functions; (2) support vector machine,
in which a hyperplane is created to represent the feature points in the space;
(3) k-nearest neighbours, in which the k closest samples are voting for the
final decision; and (4) ensemble learning, in which more than one machine





This chapter explores the state of the art for the APT detection. The re-
lated work is categorised into three main areas: previous research findings
on APTs, analysing already identified APTs and detecting possible APT
attacks.
3.1 Previous Research Findings on APT At-
tacks
In February 2013, Mandiant, an information security company in the USA,
released their APT1 report [13] revealing one of China’s cyber spying units.
In this report, Mandiant presents significant information regarding the APT1
activities. More than 141 companies were compromised by APT1 and the
size of the exfiltrated data was hundreds of terabytes. APT1 showed and
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proved that it had the ability to attack tens of corporations simultane-
ously. The target corporations were working on 20 different industries. Once
APT1 breached the victim’s network and got the point of entry, the attack-
ers maintained periodic visits to the target’s network over several months or
years. The categories of the stolen data were various including technology de-
signs, company bylaws for corporations, manufacturing costs, meeting min-
utes, performance analysis results, operating agreements, business progress,
non-disclosure agreements, memorandums of understanding and employment
agreements. Moreover, APT1 were able to get access to all companies’ emails
and lists of contacts. For example, the stolen data from only one company
"𝑥" was 6.5 terabytes, this data had been stolen over 10 months. APT1
targeted companies which used English as their main language. 87% of the
compromised organizations were located in English-speaking countries.
Regarding the APT1 infrastructure, it is found that the APT1 com-
puter systems are deployed in 13 countries. APT1 controls more than 937
Command and Control (C&C) servers hosted on 849 different IP addresses.
More than 97% of the detected connections between the attackers and the
APT1 infrastructure were established from IP addresses registered in Shang-
hai using machines configured to use Chinese language.
In October 2012, an investigation, known as (Red October) [14], was
performed by Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research and Analysis Team. This
research had been conducted after the computer networks of many interna-
tional diplomatic service agencies had been compromised. As a result of this
investigation, a network of computer systems used for spying was detected
and analysed. Collecting information from the target companies was the ma-
jor aim of the intruders. The attackers were targeting various diplomatic and
governmental corporations around the world. In each case the attacks were
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constructed of multiple stages, with the information gathered in each stage
informing the subsequent stages of the arrack. For instance, the gathered
credentials had been used frequently over a periodic visits to the victim’s
network.
Regarding the attackers’ infrastructure, at least 60 domain names were
established and many C&C servers, used as proxies to hide the main C&C
server, were hosted in several countries (most of them in Germany and Rus-
sia). This infrastructure had been used to control the compromised networks.
A multi-functional kit was developed by the attackers to collect the data from
the infected machines. the attackers used more than one channel for C&C
server communications, therefore, in case one channel was closed the attacker
could still have access to the compromised computer. In addition to the per-
sonal computers, the attackers were able to breach and gather information
from mobile devices, removable disk drives and enterprise network equip-
ment. The research team mentioned that some vulnerabilities in Microsoft
Word and Microsoft Excel had been exploited to breach the target’s network
and get the point of entry.
In January 2010, Google released a report on APTs called Operation
Aurora [15]. The report stated that Operation Aurora had started in July
2009 and was successful to breach 34 companies’ networks. In addition to
Google, Dow Chemical, Northrop Grumman, Morgan Stanley, Symantec and
Yahoo had been targeted by this attack. The first step of those attacks de-
pended on social engineering techniques and used spear phishing, the attacks
had started by sending emails to the employees of the target company, those
emails contained links to malicious websites and were formatted in such a
way to persuade the victim to click on the links. Malicious JavaScript codes
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was inserted into those websites to exploit a vulnerability in the Internet Ex-
plorer browser. According to security vendor McAfee, the techniques used
in the attacks were more advanced in comparison to those used in previous
attacks.
The Google report revealed that Operation Aurora used a variety of
malware to compromise the targets’ networks. After installing the malware,
C&C communications were maintained to control and instruct the infected
machines. All C&C communications were encrypted to avoid the traditional
intrusion detection systems, therefore, those connections were established
via TCP port 443, the default port used by secure http. After getting the
point of entry, the attackers started to used the current infected machines to
compromise other machines in the same network; this technique, known as
pivoting, enabled the attackers to avoid the detection rules set by firewalls.
In doing so, the attackers were able to move in the target network, search for
vulnerabilities, steal date and transmit it into external servers which were
controlled by the attackers.
In March 2009, an investigation study on GhostNet [16] was released
by the SecDev group in Canada. This investigation exposed a cyber spy-
ing network, called GhostNet, operated by attackers located in China. The
attackers targeted the Tibetan organizations in many countries around the
world. The SecDev research group was granted full access to the targeted
Tibetan organizations’ networks including the Private Office of the Dalai
Lama. After analysing the targeted networks and available data, the re-
search team revealed insecure web-based interfaces to four control servers.
The attackers used those interfaces to get the point of entry and breach into
the targeted networks. By tracking those four servers traffic, the SecDev
group detected a large-scale network of exploited machines. More than 1295
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machines in 103 countries were compromised, in which almost 30% of them
are considered as high-value assets located in governmental ministries and
embassies.
The compromised machine was instructed by the attacker to download
a Trojan known as gh0st RAT. The pieces of gh0st RA were hosted on servers
located on the island of Hainan in China. This Trojan gives the attacker a
full and real-time control on the infected machines. Meaning, the attacker
was able to use the compromised machine to upload and download files,
moreover, the attacker had access to the microphones, speakers and cameras
connected to the exploited computers. Social engineering techniques were
used to compromise large number of machines in the target network. Spear
phishing emails were sent to selected individuals, those emails contained
malicious attachments, in which Trojan horse programmes and exploit codes
were packed with the attached documents. The attacker then, exploiting the
infected computer, started to move in the target network and search for the
noteworthy servers which contain the data of interest. The research team
believed that the majority of the high-value targets were infected by receiving
malicious emails appeared as they were contained legitimate documents and
sent from individuals they contacted them before.
3.2 Analysing Already Identified APT Attacks
An investigation framework to find the possible targets of the APT attack is
proposed in [17]. The framework is based on analysing a known APT victim,
extracting the victim attributes and then the developed engine searches for
the possible APT targets. The authors state that the proposed system can
reduce the false positive rate with regards to N-gram based approaches.
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The work in [18] is based on a big data of APT attacks provided by
Symantec over the year 2011. The authors use TRIAGE data analytic to
classify the data into groups of APTs in which each group of attacks most
likely performed by the same attackers. The next step is to process and
analyse the characteristics and dynamics of each group separately, aiming
to determine the modus operandi attributes of the attackers. To investigate
the spread and complexity degree of each attacks group, the authors analyse
the malicious attachments used in the attacks campaigns. The authors claim
that most of the attacks used social engineering techniques to get the point of
entry to the targets’ networks. The attackers used simple malware, however,
they exploited unknown vulnerabilities at that time.
An in-depth analysis of Duqu is presented in [20]. A European organ-
isation was targeted by attackers using the Duqu malware to steal data.
The authors propose the Duqu detector toolkit, which consists of six inves-
tigation tools developed to detect the Duqu malware involved in the APT
attacks. The proposed tools can be classified into three main areas: Find-
PNFnoINF, FindDuquSys and FindDuquTmp tools, to find file existence
anomalies; FindDuquReg and CalcPNFEntropy tools, to find registry entries
and properties of files; and GetProcMem tool, to analyse code injection into
running processes. The outputs of all those tools are then written into a spe-
cific log for a possible correlation of the findings. The authors admit that the
empirical results shows a high rate of false negatives. Moreover, the detec-
tion output needs to be carefully investigated by the network security team.
Besides, the detection tools are developed to detect the APT attacks partic-
ularly performed using the Duqu malware, this means, the attack cannot be
detected when using a different piece of malware.
In [19], the authors use an undirected graph to build a map of the
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APT activities. They mention that they can find related APTs based on
the targets shared between different attacks. They can then determine the
clusters which could led to the attackers or malware developers.
3.3 Approaches to Detecting APT Attacks
In this section, some APT detection systems are analysed in more details
than others as they are used for a comparison with the developed system in
Section 6.3 on page 140.
TerminAPTor, an APT detector, is described in [70]. This detector uses
information flow tracking to find the links between the elementary attacks,
which are triggered within the APT life cycle. TerminAPTor depends on
an agent, which can be a standard intrusion detection system, to detect
those elementary attacks. This agent also records the information flows and
generates alerts in a chronological order. Each alert can be triggered by
several events. Each event is considered as a flow of information and has
four attributes: the event type, the timestamp, a list of references of input
objects, and a list of references of output objects. All events are fed to
TerminAPTor which assumes that the agent can detect all the elementary
attacks. The main objective of TerminAPTor is to decide if two events are
related to each other and find the APT scenarios. To consider two events are
correlated, there must be an information flow from the first event output to
the input of the second event. Therefore, each event should be determined
to which elementary attack belongs and then a tag is created for each new
detected attack. Each tag is attached to an object which is part of an
information flow and all tags are propagated through the monitored system
by information flows. The APT detector processes the information flows in a
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chronological order and checks the flow input, if it is tagged, and the event, if
it is part of an attack. TerminAPTor, based on specific rules, can then ignore
the triggered event, propagate the tags, create a new APT scenario or add
the event into a created APT scenario. The authors evaluated TerminAPTor
by simulating only two APT scenarios and mentioned that the APT detector
needs to be improved by filtering the false positives.
An APT detection system based on C&C domains detection is intro-
duced in [71]. This work analyses the C&C communication and states a new
feature that the access to C&C domains is independent while the access to
legal domains is correlated. Based on this feature, a new concept, which
is concurrent domains in the domain name service records (CODD), is pro-
posed. CODDs are the domains queried by the same host during a specific
time window. The suggested method depends on evaluating the correlation
between the hosts and domains and applies classification algorithms. The
detection of C&C domains relies on three features of C&C communications
which are: (1) C&C communication is HTTP-based, (2) victims connect to
C&C domains lowly and slowly, and (3) access to C&C domains is indepen-
dent. The detection method is based on the fact that C&C domains have
significantly less CODDs than benign ones. This is due to the loading of in-
lined components, such as ads and multimedia from other domains which are
auto accessed when a web page is loaded, and the continuous access of legiti-
mate domains. However, C&C domains do not have inlined components and
independently accessed. Despite the fact that the detection system achieved
significant results when validated on a public dataset, the authors mentioned
that the detection can be easily evaded when the infected hosts connect to
the C&C domains while users are surfing the Internet. This case increases
the number of CODDs for C&C domains causing to be classified as benign
ones. Moreover, missing the detection of C&C domains leads to failure in
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APT detection since this system depends on detecting only one step of the
APT life cycle.
An approach for APT detection based on spear phishing detection is
explored in [72]. This approach depends on mathematical and computational
analysis to filter spam emails. Tokens, which are considered as a group of
words and characters such as (click here, free, Viagra, replica), should be
defined for the detection algorithm to separate legitimate and spam emails.
For each new email, the whole message is processed as a string, then Bayes’
theorem is applied and the conditional probability and multiplicative rule are
calculated. A threshold is given and the email is classified. This approach can
be efficient when spear phishing attack is targeting hosts randomly. However,
this is not the case in APT where the attacker targets selected host and
crafts the malicious email carefully to appear as it is sent to that specific
host. Meaning, the spear phishing email might not include any of the tokens
which are necessary for the algorithm process. Additionally, depending on
one step for APT detection leads the system to fail when missing that step.
A statistical APT detector, similar to TerminAPTor detector [70] previ-
ously mentioned on page 41, is developed in [73]. This system considers that
APT undergoes five states which are delivery, exploit, installation, C&C and
actions; and several activities are taken in each state. The generated events
in each state are correlated in a statistical manner. The correlation, across
multiple data sources, undergoes three levels: (1) Host-level combination, to
identify malicious host-level activities; (2) Host-neighbourhood scoring, to
detect potential movements of the attacker to infect other hosts; (3) Across-
host combination, to find machines targeted by the attack. The events are
extracted from four sources: mail, windows event, web, and domain name
server (DNS) logs. Apart from the mail logs, all the data sources provide
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the IP addresses of the event’s source and destination which are used for the
purpose of correlation. This system requires significant expert knowledge to
set up and maintain.
An active-learning-based framework for malicious PDFs detection is sug-
gested in [74]. These malicious PDFs can be used in the early steps of APT
to get the point of entry. The system collects all PDFs transferred over the
network, then all known benign and malicious files are filtered by the "known
files module" which depends on white lists, reputation systems and antivirus
signature repository. Following this, the remaining files "unknown files" are
checked for their compatibility as viable PDF files. Based on the fact that
most of the malicious files are incompatible, the unknown incompatible files
are blocked giving the system a significant reduction of the computational
cost. The unknown compatible PDFs are then processed by a detection
model using SVM classifier with the radial basis function (RBF) kernel. This
model is trained on a training dataset contains malicious and benign PDF
files. As an output of the detection model, the unknown compatible PDF
files can be classified as benign or malicious, or suspected as informative.
The PDF files are considered as informative when the classifier is not confi-
dent regarding its classification (the files lie inside the SVM margin) or the
files have the maximal distance from the SVM separating hyperplane. These
informative files are sent to a security expert to be analysed manually, then
they are labelled and added to the training dataset to retrain the detection
model. In addition, the malicious labelled PDFs are added to the antivirus
signature repository to maintain its updatability. Although this framework
has not been implemented and validated yet, it highlights and addresses the
updatability issue of the current detection models. However, this suggested
approach detects only one step of the APT life cycle.
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A classification model for APT detection is presented in [75]. This model
is built based on machine learning algorithms. First, the legitimate traffic for
normal users is analysed aiming to extract the CPU usage, memory usage,
open ports and number of files in the system32 folder. A piece of malware,
which is previously used for the APT attack, is injected into the network
and the four features are extracted. The dataset of benign and malicious
features are used to train the detection model using different machine learn-
ing algorithms. The trained models are validated on a test dataset and the
best one, which has the highest accuracy, is chosen. The model can then be
used for detection. It is mentioned that the random forest classifier has a
detection accuracy of 99.8%. However, this model is limited to detect APT
only if the attacker used the same piece of malware used when training the
model.
An approach based on Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) is proposed
in [76]. This approach focuses on detecting the last step of APT which is
the data exfiltration. A DLP algorithm is used to process the data traffic to
detect data leaks and generate “fingerprints” according to the features of the
leak. These fingerprints might have various types of information such as data
destination or file hash. However, they should have a standardized format
such as Extensible Markup Language (XML). The fingerprints are then sent
to a fingerprint database to acquire information regarding the data leak.
The acquired information is provided to external cyber counterintelligence
(CCI) sensors in order to track the location or path of the leaked data. The
CCI sensors can be operated by the government or trusted partners such as
operating system manufacturers, antivirus software companies and Internet
service providers. These sensors have passive access to several nodes on
the Internet and can search for a match with the leaked data fingerprints.
If a match is found, this means either the leaked data location has been
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found or the leaked data has passed through the corresponded sensor node.
This information is passed back to the CCI analysis unit to be used along
with other information provided by other CCI sensors to detect the actual
attacker. This approach is limited to detect only one step of APT which is
the data exfiltration. In addition, it cannot achieve the real time detection
as the CCI analysis unit should wait for the information from the sensors.
Moreover, it is not guaranteed that the CCI sensors can provide the required
information regarding the leaked data fingerprints.
A working prototype, SPuNge, is presented in [21]. The proposed ap-
proach depends on the gathered data on the hosts’ side and aims to detect
possible APT attacks. The authors state that their system can successfully
filter the large number of the threat events on the users’ side into a manage-
able amount can be processed effectively. SPuNge uses a set of clustering
methods to classify the infected machines into groups in which each group
has the same malicious activity such as connecting to C&C servers, drive-by
download attack or exploit kits connection. Then the machines’ location and
organisations’ field of work (e.g., oil & gas or government) are correlated to
detect malicious attack activities. SPuNge undergoes two main phases, in
the first one, the detected malicious URLs are analysed. Those URLs can be
connected by the hosts’ computers over HTTP(S) with an Internet browser
or by malware installed on the infected machines. The computers which
show a similar activity are then determined. For example, all computers
which request the same URLs during the same attack campaign are grouped
together. And so on for the computers which connect to the same URLs
because they are infected with the same malware. To achieve the first phase
aims, SPuNge relies on a set of clustering methods to group the machines
according to the requested malicious URLs. In the second phase, the con-
nections of the machines clustered in the first phase are correlated to find
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servers, companies or networks which are possibly involved in APT activi-
ties. For instance, machines can be correlated if they are located in the same
location or working for the same organisation. To achieve the second phase
aims, SPuNge uses an analysis framework to detect the malicious activities
involved in APTs. Although the authors claim that SPuNge can work effec-
tively on APTs detection, their system basically depends on detecting one
activity of the APT attack, which is malicious URL connection, and does
not consider the other activities of APT. Meaning, if the detection system
misses the malicious URL connection, the whole APT scenario will not be
detected. In addition, the proposed approach is based on a gathered data
provided by an anti-virus vendor, in other words, the system needs to be fed
with the data and cannot achieve real time detection.
A context-based framework for APT detection is explained in [77]. This
framework is based on modelling APT as an attack pyramid in which the
top of the pyramid represents the attack goal, and the lateral planes indi-
cates the environments involved in the APT life cycle. Theses lateral planes
are different from one organisation to another according to the environments
where the events are recorded. This approach considers four main planes:
(1) physical plane, records events that relate potential targets to physical ma-
chines or working locations; (2) user plane, records events that are related
to privileged users who have access to sensitive data; (3) network plane,
this plane includes all the events recorded by firewalls, intrusion detection
and prevention systems, network flow sensors, routers and VPN access; and
(4) application plane, records server and end host application logs, and appli-
cation gateways such as http, SIP, RTP, DNS, SSH, ftp, telnet. The recorded
events are collected and the profile selection is applied. The framework then
links the events into contexts which are fed to the alert system. For each
context, the alert system applies the detection rules which can be classified
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into three major categories: (1) signature based rules, match the observed
events and behaviour against known signatures database; (2) profiling based
rules, compare the observed behaviour or profile with a behaviour baseline;
and (3) policy based rules, which are the static rules set according to the
organization policies. If an APT is detected by the alert system, an alert is
sent to the security analyst to start investigating the alert. This detection
framework is similar to the statistical detector [73], previously mentioned on
page 43, and requires significant expert knowledge to set up and maintain.
With regards to the processing of multiple streams of events, IBM sug-
gests a conceptual model for event processing in [22] and describes the basic
requirements to design an efficient correlation system. The work explained
in [23] is based on finite state machines and uses a query language for event
processing. Both systems can process the events in real time, a key limita-
tion shared by both approaches is that they cannot detect so called low &
slow attacks, which take place over an extended time period.
3.4 Summary
Taking into consideration the great damage and substantial financial loss
caused by the APT attacks, and based on the fact that the current intru-
sion detection methods still have weaknesses in the detection of APT, there
is a need to research new approaches and techniques regarding the APT
detection. Most of the research in the area of APT detection has focused
on analysing already identified APTs or detecting a particular APT attack
which uses a specific piece of malware. Some previous studies have attempted
to detect potential APT attacks. However, they face serious shortcomings
in achieving real time detection [21], detecting all APT attack steps [21],
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balance between false positive and false negative rates [20], and correlating
of events spanning over a long period of time [22] [23].
This thesis presents a Machine-Learning-based APT detection system
(MLAPT) which runs through three main phases: threat detection, alert
correlation and attack prediction. The suggested detection modules take into
consideration most of the APT attack steps and the developed algorithms
are able to process the network traffic in real time. Besides, the proposed
correlation framework can reduce the false positive rate resulting from the
detection system. To the best of our knowledge, the prediction module is





System for Real-Time APT
Detection and Prediction
In this chapter, the proposed Machine-Learning-based APT detection sys-
tem (MLAPT), developed by the author, is presented. The architecture of
MLAPT is introduced first, along with a brief definition of the three main
phases of MLAPT: Detection; Correlation; and Prediction. Following this,
more description and details regarding each MLAPT phase are given. This
chapter defines and explains the MLAPT phases, while the implementation
of MLAPT is presented in the following chapter.
4.1 Design Rationale
Since the APT attack is a multi-step attack, the detection of this attack
should go through the detection of the techniques used within the APT life
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cycle. Therefore, detection modules should be developed to detect the most
common techniques used in the APT attack steps. However, detecting an
APT technique itself does not mean detecting an APT attack.
Even though an individual module alert indicates a technique which can
possibly be used in an APT attack, this technique can be used for other types
of attacks or it can be even a benign one. For example, domain flux, port
scanning and malicious C&C communications, used in the APT attack, can
be also used for botnet attacks [78]. Moreover, Tor network connection, used
for data exfiltration in the APT attack, can also be used legally to protect
the confidentiality of a user traffic [79]. Thus, individually these detection
modules are ineffective and their information should be fused to build a
complete picture regarding an APT attack. For this reason, a correlation
framework should be developed to link the outputs of the detection modules
and reduce the false positive rate of the detection system.
Predicting the APT attack in its early steps would minimise the damage
and prevent the attacker from achieving the goal of data exfiltration. With
a historical record of the correlation framework output, machine learning
algorithms can be used to train a prediction model. As the purpose of the
prediction model is to classify the early alerts of the correlation framework,
classification algorithms should be selected to train the model.
4.2 MLAPT Architecture
MLAPT runs through three main phases: threat detection, alert correlation
and attack prediction. Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of MLAPT.































Figure 4.1: The Architecture of MLAPT.
Initially, the network traffic is scanned and processed to detect possible
techniques used in the APT life cycle. To this end, eight detection mod-
ules have been developed; each module implements a method to detect one
technique used in one of APT attack steps, and it is independent from the
other modules. MLAPT implemented eight modules, presented later in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 on page 54, to detect the most commonly used techniques in the
APT life cycle. The output of this phase are alerts, also known as events,
triggered by individual modules.
The alerts raised by individual detection modules are then fed to the
correlation framework. The aim of the correlation framework is to find alerts
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could be related and belong to one APT attack scenario. The process in
this phase undergoes three main steps: alerts filter to identify redundant or
repeated alerts; clustering of alerts which most likely belong to the same APT
attack scenario; and correlation indexing to evaluate the degree of correlation
between alerts of each cluster.
In the final phase, a machine-learning-based prediction module is used
by the network security team to determine the probability of the early alerts
to develop a complete APT attack. This allows the network security team to
predict the APT attack in its early steps and apply the required procedure
to stop it before completion and minimize the damage. The detection of
APT is different from the prediction. The detection can be when two or
more steps of APT are correlated. However, the prediction can be achieved
after the first two steps of APT are linked.
Combining all the proposed modules in one system makes it relevant to
APTs, as the detection modules are developed to detect most commonly used
techniques in the APT life cycle. The outputs of those detection modules
are then fed to the correlation framework to link them aiming to find the
APT scenario. The prediction module is based on the correlation framework
output to achieve the system functionality of the APT prediction.
4.2.1 MLAPT Detection Modules
The detection modules play a significant role in MLAPT to achieve its func-
tionality. MLAPT implemented eight modules, these modules are chosen to
detect the most commonly used techniques in APT, according to several re-
ports like Mandiant APT1 report [80] and Trend Micro report [1], and they
are able to form a clear picture on the APT attack scenario. The detection of
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all modules is in real time, as MLAPT can process the sniffed network traffic
immediately and does not need to store it. Some of the detection modules
are blacklist-based, some of these blacklists are publicly published and some
are related to private projects. All used blacklists are automatically updated
within MLAPT, based on different intelligence feeds at once. Taking into
consideration the APT steps, mentioned in Section 2.1 on page 13, Table 4.1
shows the MLAPT detection modules for each APT step.
Table 4.1: The MLAPT detection modules for each APT step.
APT step Detection modules
Step 1
Intelligence gathering
This initial step includes a passive
process which cannot be detected
through network traffic monitoring,
so there are no detection modules.
Step 2
Point of entry
Disguised exe file detection
Malicious file hash detection
Malicious domain name detection
Step 3
C&C communication
Malicious IP address detection




This is internal traffic within the
target’s network. MLAPT monitors
the inbound and outbound traffic,







4.2.1.1 Disguised exe File Detection (DeFD)
According to Mandiant APT1 report [80], spear phishing is the most com-
monly used technique to get the point of entry in APT. The spear phishing
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emails contain either a malicious attachment or a hyperlink to a malicious
file. The subject line and the text in the email body are usually relevant to
the recipient. Executable files supposed to end in .exe are made to appear as
simple document files (pdf, doc, ppt, excel) to convince the victim to click
on it.
The DeFD module detects disguised exe files over the connections. In
other words, it detects if the content of the file is exe while the extension is
not exe. The network traffic is processed, all connections are analysed and
all exe files identified when transferring over the connections are filtered.
This filtering is based on the file content. Following this, the file name
extension should be checked to decide about raising an alert on disguised
exe file detection.
4.2.1.2 Malicious File Hash Detection (MFHD)
The MFHD module detects any malicious file downloaded by one of the
network hosts. It is based on a blacklist of malicious file hashes [13]. The
network traffic is processed, all connections are analysed and MD5, SHA1 and
SHA256 hashes are calculated for each new file identified when transferring
over a connection. The calculated hashes are then matched with the blacklist.
4.2.1.3 Malicious Domain Name Detection (MDND)
The MDND module is used to detect any connection to a mali-
cious domain name. It is based on a blacklist of malicious domain
names [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86]. DNS traffic is filtered, all DNS requests
are analysed and the queries are matched with the blacklist.
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4.2.1.4 Malicious IP Address Detection (MIPD)
The MIPD module detects any connection between an infected host and a
C&C server. The detection is based on a blacklist of malicious IPs of C&C
servers [87] [88] [89] [90]. MIPD processes the network traffic to search for a
match in the source and destination IP addresses for each connection with
the IP blacklist.
4.2.1.5 Malicious SSL Certificate Detection (MSSLD)
C&C communications are usually protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
encryption, which makes it difficult to identify malicious traffic. MSSLD
aims at detecting C&C communications based on a blacklist of malicious SSL
certificates [91] [92]. This blacklist consists of two forms of SSL certificates,
the SHA1 fingerprints and the serial & subject, which are associated with
malware and malicious activities. The network traffic is processed and all
secure connections are filtered. The SSL certificate of each secure connection
is then matched with the SSL certificate blacklist.
4.2.1.6 Domain Flux Detection (DFD)
One common technique used for C&C communications is the domain flux
technique, in which each infected machine separately uses a Domain Gener-
ation Algorithm (DGA) to generate a list of domain names [93]. By using
the domain flux technique, the infected host attempts to query and connect
to a large number of generated domain names, which are expected to link
the host to the C&C servers. This technique makes it difficult for law en-
forcement to successfully shut down a large number of domains. To prevent
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infected hosts from connecting to the C&C servers, law enforcement needs to
pre-register all the domains which an infected host queries every day before
the attacker registers them [94].
The DFD module detects algorithmically generated domain flux, where
the infected host queries for the existence of a large number of domains,
whilst the owner has to register only one. This leads to the failure of many
of DNS queries. DFD utilizes DNS query failures to detect domain flux
attacks. The network traffic is processed, particularly DNS traffic. All DNS
query failures are analysed and a threshold for DNS query failures from
the same IP address is imposed to detect domain flux attacks and identify
infected hosts.
4.2.1.7 Scan Detection (SD)
Network scanning provides list of open ports, closed ports and filtered ports.
Network related details such as IP address, MAC address, router, gateway
filtering, firewall rules, etc. can be obtained through such scan [95].
The SD module detects port scanning attacks which aims to identify
the noteworthy servers and services for future data exploitation. SD is based
on tracking all failed connection attempts, and a threshold for those failed
attempts is imposed over a specific time interval to detect scanning attacks
and identify infected hosts.
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4.2.1.8 Tor Connection Detection (TorCD)
Tor [96] [97] is an anonymous communication network used to secure the
privacy of user traffic by encrypting all connections through the overlay net-
work. Tor uses onion routing to direct client’s traffic over a circuit of different
relays to its destination, denying any single relay to know the complete path
of the traffic [98]. Tor is often misused by criminals and hackers to remotely
direct and instruct infected machines [99].
The TorCD module detects any connection to a Tor network. It is based
on a list of Tor servers which is publicly published [100]. The network traffic
is processed and the source and destination IP addresses for each connection
are matched with Tor servers list.
4.2.2 FCI Correlation Framework
This phase of MLAPT takes the output of all detection modules (the gen-
erated alerts) as an input, and aims to find alerts could be correlated and
belong to one APT attack scenario. FCI (Filter, Cluster, and Index) runs
through three main steps: (1) Alerts filter, which filters redundant or re-
peated alerts; (2) Alerts clustering, which clusters alerts which potentially
belong to the same APT attack scenario; and (3) Correlation indexing, which
evaluates the correlations between alerts of each cluster.
In Section 4.2.1, eight attack detection modules are presented, each
module detects one possible technique used in one of the APT steps. The
output of each module is an alert which is generated when an attack is
detected. Each alert has seven attributes (alert_type, timestamp, src_ip,
src_port, dest_ip, dest_port, infected_host). Table 4.2 summarizes the
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steps of the APT attack that can be detected by MLAPT and the alerts
which can be generated for each step.


















All alerts generated by the detection modules are fed to the correlation
framework. However, those alerts are not the only ones detected by the
the modules. When an APT technique is detected, and before an alert is
generated, the module checks whether the same alert has been generated
during the previous day, if so, the alert is ignored. This alerts suppression
reduces the computational cost of the FCI correlation framework. The FCI
process steps will be explained in this section. As an output of the FCI
correlation framework, two main alerts can be generated:
∙ apt_full_scenario_alert: This alert is generated when FCI detects a
full APT attack scenario during a specific time window, called the
correlation time. This is the period in which APT is expected to com-
plete its life cycle. A full attack scenario is one in which all possible
detectable steps of an APT are detected by FCI. In other words, FCI
detects four correlated steps of an APT, i.e. four different alerts each
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one is from a different step. Based on Table 4.2, and taking into con-
sideration the APT life cycle, FCI is able to detect nine possible full
scenarios of APT (APT-full). These possible full APT scenarios can
be expressed as:
𝐴 = [𝑎1 ∨ 𝑎2 ∨ 𝑎3] (4.1a)
𝐵 = [𝑏1 ∨ 𝑏2 ∨ 𝑏3] (4.1b)
𝐶 = [𝑐1] (4.1c)
𝐷 = [𝑑1] (4.1d)
𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 = 𝐴 ∧𝐵 ∧ 𝐶 ∧𝐷 (4.1e)
∙ apt_sub_scenario_alert: This alert is generated when FCI detects
two or three, rather than all, correlated steps of an APT attack dur-
ing a specific time window. In this partial attack detection scenario,
alerts from one or two steps were not generated. Thus, FCI can gener-
ate two types of this alert: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert ; and
apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert. FCI is able to detect forty six
possible APT sub-scenarios which can be expressed as:
𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑠𝑢𝑏 = [𝐴 ∧ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ∨𝐷)] ∨ [𝐵 ∧ (𝐶 ∨𝐷)] ∨ [𝐶 ∧𝐷]∨
[(𝐴 ∨𝐵) ∧ (𝐶 ∨𝐷)] ∨ [𝐴 ∧𝐵 ∧ 𝐶] ∨ [𝐴 ∧ 𝐶 ∧𝐷] ∨ [𝐵 ∧ 𝐶 ∧𝐷]
(4.2)
The APT can still compromise the target network for months or years if
it is not detected. However, one week might be enough for APT to complete
one life cycle.
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4.2.2.1 Alerts Filter (AF)
The first module of the FCI correlation framework filters redundant or re-
peated alerts. The AF module takes all alerts generated by the various
detection modules as an input. For each new generated alert, the alerts filter
checks if the alert has been generated during the correlation time window. If
the new alert is the same type and has the same attributes of a recorded one,
then the new alert is ignored. This filtering module reduces computational
cost of the FCI correlation framework.
4.2.2.2 Alerts Clustering (AC)
This module clusters alerts which most likely belong to the same APT attack
scenario. One cluster can represent a possible APT full or sub-scenario, i.e.
it can contain one, two, three or four different alerts; each alert for a different
APT step. The AC module takes the AF output, all alerts generated by the
detection modules after repeated ones are filtered, as an input. All incoming
alerts are stored by AC for a correlation time. For each new alert, the AC
module checks all stored alerts for the clustering possibility. The clustering
algorithm in this module is scenario-based, which utilizes three main rules:
∙ Alert step: Alerts for the same APT attack step cannot be in one
cluster.
∙ Alert type: Alerts of the same type cannot be in one cluster.
∙ Alert time: Cluster’s alerts should be all triggered within the corre-
lation time, and alerts order should be corresponded with the APT
life cycle. Meaning, if t(d), t(c), t(b) and t(a) are the times when the
alerts from the APT steps six, five, three and two, respectively, have
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been triggered, the clustering algorithm can classify those alerts into
one cluster only if they meet the following two conditions:
t(d) > t(c) > t(b) > t(a)
t(d) - t(a) <= Correlation_time
The AC module has four processing engines, explained later in Sec-
tion 5.2.2 on page 94, each engine processes all alerts which belong to one of
the APT detectable steps. Based on the incoming alert step, a corresponded
engine runs. As a result of AC process, the new incoming alert can be classi-
fied into an existing APT cluster, a new APT cluster can be created, or the
new alert is ignored as it does not meet the rules and cannot be clustered at
all. The output of AC is APT clusters. Each cluster contains a maximum of
four alerts, which potentially belong to one APT full or sub-scenario. The
produced cluster alerts are evaluated using the correlation index algorithm,
presented in the following Section 4.2.2.3 on page 63, to decide whether
they are correlated. The prediction module uses a historical record of the
monitored network and takes the correlation dataset, built by FCI over six
months or more, as an input. The correlation dataset contains the correlated
clusters, both full and sub APT scenarios, and the correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑
for each cluster.
4.2.2.3 Correlation Indexing (CI)
The third processing module evaluates the correlations between alerts in each
cluster to determine if they belong to a full or sub APT attack scenario. This
module has two major functions. The first function is to evaluate the corre-
lations between alerts when building the cluster. The goal of this correlation
process is to filters clusters having uncorrelated alerts. The second function
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calculates the correlation index of each cluster by the end of the correlation
window. The latter function is essential to build a historical record of the
monitored network to be used in the next module of the FCI correlation
framework, namely the prediction module.
The correlation indexing (CI) algorithm makes use of the attributes of
each alert in the cluster to calculate the cluster’s correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑. To
find the 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 for each cluster, the CI algorithm calculates the correlation
between each two alerts (steps) in the cluster. Therefore, three values are
calculated within each cluster: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏, the correlation between the second
step (𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡1) and the third step (𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡2) of APT; 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐, the correlation
between the third step (𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡2) and the fifth step (𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡3) of APT; and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑,
the correlation between the fifth step (𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡3) and the sixth step (𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡4) of
APT.
The clustering algorithm is based on alert_type and timestamp at-
tributes of each alert. However, the correlation indexing algorithm is based
on infected_host and scanned_host attributes. To calculate 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐
and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑, taking into consideration the APT attack life cycle and the at-




1, if [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡2, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡2] = [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡1, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡1]
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
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𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡3, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡3] = [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡2, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡2]




1, if [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡4, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡4] = [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡3, 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡]
or [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡4, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡4] = [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡3, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡3]
or [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡4, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡4] = [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡2, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡2]
or [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡4, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡4] = [𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡1, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡1]
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
When 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏 equals to 1, this means there is a correlation between the
second step and the third step of APT and the corresponding alerts can be
in one cluster. When 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏 equals to 0, there is no correlation and the two
alerts cannot be in one cluster. And so on for 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑.
The CI algorithm calculates the cluster’s correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 using
the following equation:
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑 (4.3)
Since 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏, 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑 values can be only 1 or 0, the cluster’s
correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 is always positive and can take one of the following
values:
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∙ 0; there is no correlation between any of the cluster’s alerts, and the
cluster’s alerts cannot belong to one APT attack scenario.
∙ 1; there is a correlation between two different steps of an APT
attack, and the cluster’s alerts belong to one APT sub-scenario
"apt_sub_scenario_two_steps".
∙ 2; there is a correlation between three different steps of an APT
attack, and the cluster’s alerts belong to one APT sub-scenario
"apt_sub_scenario_three_steps".
∙ 3; there is a correlation between four different steps (all detectable
steps) of an APT attack, and the cluster’s alerts belong to one APT
full scenario "apt_full_scenario".
All the clusters and their correlation index values are recorded into a
specific dataset, the correlation_dataset, to be used in the Prediction mod-
ule.
4.2.3 Prediction Module (PM)
This module is used by the network security team to estimate the probability
of an apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert, generated by the FCI correlation
framework, to develop a complete APT attack. In practical terms, it predicts
if FCI will generate an apt_full_scenario_alert in the future based on the
attributes of the current apt_sub_scenario_alert. This prediction gives the
network security team a sign to perform more forensics on the correspond-
ing two suspicious connections and deny the attacker to complete the APT
life cycle. The prediction module uses a historical record of the monitored
network and applies machine learning techniques to achieve its functionality.
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PM takes the correlation dataset, built by FCI over six months or more,
as an input. The required period of time to build the correlation dataset
depends on the number of correlated clusters generated by FCI. This num-
ber affects the number of samples used to train the prediction model, as it
is explained in Section 5.3.1 on page 108. The correlation dataset contains
the correlated clusters, both full and sub APT scenarios, and the correla-
tion index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 for each cluster. The process in this module undergoes
three main steps: (1) Preparing the dataset, to be available to be consumed
by machine learning algorithms; (2) Training the prediction model, differ-
ent machine learning algorithms are applied and the best model which has
the highest accuracy is chosen; and (3) Using the model for prediction, the
security team apply the model on FCI real time alerts. The output of this
module is a prediction model used by the network security team for live
traffic monitor and APT prediction. Section 5.3 provides more details about
the components of PM, the way that probabilistic calculations are made,
and how the network security team can use the output of this module for
prediction.
4.3 Summary
This chapter presents the MLAPT architecture. MLAPT runs through three
main phases: Detection; Correlation; and Prediction. In the first phase, eight
detection modules have been developed, each detection module is to detect
one technique possibly used in one of the APT steps. These detection mod-
ules are as follows: disguised exe file detection (DeFD), malicious file hash
detection (MFHD), malicious domain name detection (MDND), malicious
IP address detection (MIPD), malicious SSL certificate detection (MSSLD),
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domain flux detection (DFD), scan detection (SD), and Tor connection de-
tection (TorCD). In the second phase, the FCI correlation framework aims
to find alerts could be related and belonged to one APT attack scenario. The
process in this phase undergoes three main steps: alerts filter (AF), alerts
clustering (AC), and correlation indexing (CI). In the last phase, the pre-
diction module (PM) aims to build a prediction model used by the network
security team for live traffic monitor and APT prediction.
Chapter 5
MLAPT Implementation
In this chapter, the implementation of MLAPT will be introduced and the
used frameworks, tools and programming languages will be mentioned. As
MLAPT consists of three main phases: threat detection, alert correlation
and attack prediction; the implementation algorithms of each phase will be
presented separately.
5.1 Implementation of the Detection Modules
There are several approaches to network security monitoring. However, there
is no best approach and each approach performs best in a certain environ-
ment and fits different purposes. Wireshark [101] is an effective tool for
manual analysis, predominantly of small capture files. Tcpdump is packet-
oriented approach that works well in scenarios where filtering individual
packets by L3/L4 attributes, like IP address, TCP flags and payload bytes,
is sufficient. It does not work well for stream reassembly or L7 protocol anal-
ysis [102]. Snort [103] and Suricata [104] work well when the objective is to
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match patterns in network data. Bro [105] [106] allows development of ad-
vanced detection methods and offers the best software/environment for the
development of novel detection or processing techniques. It can be used for
continuous monitoring of high-throughput networks. Moreover, the scripting
environment is extensible in a memory-safe language specialized in network
data processing.
All detection modules are implemented on top of Bro. Bro is a passive,
open-source network traffic analyser. It is primarily a security monitor which
inspects all traffic on a link in depth for signs of suspicious activity. The
most immediate benefit gained from deploying Bro is an extensive set of
log files which record a network’s activity in high-level terms. These logs
include not only a comprehensive record of every connection seen on the
wire, but also application-layer transcripts such as, e.g., all HTTP sessions
with their requested URIs, key headers, MIME types, and server responses;
DNS requests with replies; and much more. Bro event engine reduces the
incoming packet stream into a series of higher-level events, more than 300
events. These events reflect network activity in policy-neutral terms, i.e.
they describe what has been seen, but not why, or whether it is significant.
The MLAPT detection modules consume and handle some of Bro events;
all connection information (such as timestamp, src_ip, src_port, dest_ip,
dest_port) can be extracted from those events, in addition to more specific
information related to each individual event.
The MFHD, MDND and MSSLD modules make use of Bro Intelligence
Framework [107]; this framework enables the modules to consume data from
different data sources and make it available for matching, as explained later
in the implementation section of each module.
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All blacklists of blacklist-based detection modules are automatically up-
dated based on different intelligence feeds at once. The automatic update
runs parallel with the detection modules process and there is no need to
stop or restart MLAPT. This parallel-running feature allows a continuous
live monitoring of the network traffic and supports real time detection. Fur-
thermore, to keep the integrity of the blacklist files during updates, MLAPT
detection modules keep using the current copy of the blacklists while the
source copy is updated. After blacklist update is complete, the modules
start using the updated copy. Those blacklists files are stored at the server
that monitors the network traffic.
Based on the detection module, two automatic update mechanisms have
been applied. Figure 5.1 shows the automatic update of the blacklists used
by the MFHD, MDND and MSSLD modules. The user crontab file is config-
ured to run blacklist_update.sh each day at 3:00 am, this shell script connects
through Internet to the data source servers and downloads updated blacklists
of malicious file hashes, malicious domain names and malicious SSL certifi-
cate hashes into a new blacklist.intel text file. This text file is connected
to the Intelligence Framework, which consumes it as explained later in the
implementation section of each module.






Figure 5.1: Automatic update of the blacklists used by the MFHD,
MDND and MSSLD modules.
MLAPT Implementation 72
Figure 5.2 shows the automatic update of the blacklists used by the
MIPD, MSSLD and TorCD modules. The user crontab file is config-
ured to run blacklist_update.sh each day at 3:00 am, this shell script con-
nects through Internet to the intelligence feeds and downloads updated
blacklist of malicious IPs, malicious SSL certificates and Tor servers into
ip_blacklist.txt, ssl_blacklist.txt and Tor_servers_list.txt files, respectively.
The Input Framework [108], built in Bro, enables the modules to use those
text files as an input to MLAPT. The Input Framework reads ip_blacklist.txt,
ssl_blacklist.txt and Tor_servers_list.txt files into t_ip_blacklist table,
bad_ssl group and t_tor_server table, respectively, which are used by the
corresponding module as explained later in the implementation section of
each module.









bad_ssl used by 
MSSLD
ssl_blacklist.txt
t_tor_server used by 
TorCD
tor_servers_list.txt
Figure 5.2: Automatic update of the blacklists used by the MIPD,
MSSLD and TorCD modules.
As an output of each detection module, in case of an APT technique
is detected, a corresponding event (alert) is generated. This event is to be
used in the FCI correlation framework as explained later in Section 5.2 on
page 93. Additionally, an alert email is sent to RT (Request tracker) [109]
where the network security team can perform additional forensics and re-
spond to the triggered alert. It is assumed that the network security team
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responds to the generated alert within 24 hours, therefore, the detection
modules suppress all the same alerts (the same alert is the one which has
the same infected host and the same malicious item) into one alert per day,
so no repeated alert emails bother the network security team. Moreover,
this alerts suppression reduces the computational cost of the FCI correla-
tion framework. To this end, after an alert is generated, the module adds
the triggered alert into a specific corresponding table where it stays for one
day to ensure that the module does not generate the same alert within the
next 24 hours. When an APT technique is detected, and before an alert
is generated, the module checks the corresponding table in order to con-
clude if the same alert has been generated during the previous day, if so,
the alert is ignored. Along with generating a new alert, information regard-
ing the alert and the malicious connection (alert_type, timestamp, src_ip,
src_port, dest_ip, dest_port, infected_host, malicious_item) is written into
a specific log (individual log for each APT technique detection) to keep a
historical record of the monitored network.
In case of cryptographically embedded payloads for APTs paradigms,
even the connections are encrypted, the detection modules (except DeFD
and MFHD) are still effective as they depend on investigating the packets’
headers and not the payload.
5.1.1 Implementation of the Disguised exe File Detec-
tion Module (DeFD)
Algorithm 1 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the DeFD
module. The network traffic is processed; this module waits for
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file_over_new_connection event to be generated by Bro. This event in-
dicates that a file has been seen in the process of being transferred over a
connection [110] [111]. Then describe() function is applied on that file; this
function provides a text description regarding metadata of the file, so the
file name can be extracted.
Algorithm 1 Implementation pseudo-code of DeFD
1: Get t_exe_file table
2: Get file_over_new_connection event
3: fname ← file name
4: if the connection is established by a host from the monitored
5: network then
6: if the file MIME type is in t_exe_file table then
7: if file MIME type = fname extension then
8: if the same disguised_exe_alert has been generated over
9: the last day then
10: goto End
11: else
12: Generate an event (disguised_exe_alert)
13: Write disguised_exe_alert into disguised_exe_detection.log
14: Send an alert email to RT












This method is able to detect disguised exe files in both cases, uploaded
and downloaded, but DeFD aims to detect only downloaded disguised exe
files, as they are the ones used in the second step of APT. Thus, DeFD
checks the current connection, in which a new file has seen being transferred,
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if it is established by a host from the monitored network. This is done by
checking the connection source IP address through is_local_addr function;
this function returns true if an address corresponds to one of the defined
local networks, false if not. For this reason, the subnet of the monitored
network should be defined.
Following this, the mime_type, which can be extracted from
file_over_new_connection event, is checked for its presence in t_exe_file
table. MIME stands for (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions). It is a way
of identifying Internet files according to their nature and format. For exam-
ple, using the "Content-type" header value defined in a HTTP response, the
browser can open the file with the proper extension/plugin [112]. t_exe_file
table contains the MIME types of the files which DeFD aims to find and
filter, i.e. MIME types of exe files. Therefore, if the transferred file is an
exe file (based on its mime_type), DeFD checks whether the extension in
the file name is exe; this file name extension is extracted from the output
of the describe() function previously mentioned. If the file name extension
is not exe, this means it is a disguised exe file. Before an alert is raised,
DeFD checks if an alert regarding the same host and for the same disguised
exe file has been generated during the previous day. This check is to en-
sure that DeFD does not generate the same alert about the same set (host,
file) during one day, therefore, DeFD checks if the current set exists in the
t_suppress_disguised_exe_alert table, this table contains all detected sets
during the last day.
If the current set (host, file) had not been detected during the previous
24 hours, DeFD generates disguised_exe_alert event to be used in the FCI
correlation framework. The malicious connection information is written into
a specific log disguised_exe_detection.log, to keep a historical record of the
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monitored network. An alert email regarding disguised exe file detection is
sent to RT, where the network security team can perform additional forensics
and respond to it. The current detected set (host, file) is added into the
t_suppress_disguised_exe_alert table where it stays for one day to ensure
that DeFD does not generate another alert about the same set during the
same day. The written information into disguised_exe_detection.log is:





This module does not account for malware not being attached to exe-
cutables, called fileless malware. This type of malware evades detection by
reducing or eliminating the storage of any binaries on disk and instead hides
its code in the registry of a compromised host. Malware authors have made
detection challenging through techniques such as polymorphism, implanting
watchdogs, revoking permissions, and more [113].
5.1.2 Implementation of the Malicious File Hash De-
tection Module (MFHD)
Algorithm 2 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the MFHD module.
MFHD makes use of Bro Intelligence Framework mentioned in Section 5.1 on
page 69. In this module, the intelligence framework is configured to monitor
all file hashes which are identified when transferring over the network traffic.
This framework is connected to blacklist.intel text file, which contains the
files hashes blacklist.
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Algorithm 2 Implementation pseudo-code of MFHD
1: Get malicious fills hashes blacklist (blacklist.intel)
2: Get file_new event
3: Calculate MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 hashes
4: Send MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 hashes to Bro Intelligence Framework
5: if MD5, SHA1 or SHA256 hashes are in blacklist.intel then
6: if the connection is oriented to a host from the monitored
7: network then




12: Generate an event (hash_alert)
13: Write hash_alert into blacklist_detection_hash.log
14: Send an alert email to RT









The network traffic is processed; MFHD waits for file_new event to be
generated by Bro. This event indicates that the analysis of a new file has
started [114]. MFHD then calculates MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 hashes for
the current file; these calculations are performed by three functions, which
are add_analyzer_md5, add_analyzer_sha1, and add_analyzer_sha256. To
ensure the real time process, the calculation of file hashes is limited to the
files of size up to 500 KB, based on the fact that the average size of a
malware sample is 338 KB [115]. All calculated hashes are sent to the in-
telligence framework where its presence should be checked within the intel-
ligence dataset (blacklist.intel text file). When a piece of intelligence data,
which in this case is the calculated file hash, is detected, the intelligence
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framework generates Intel::match event. This event is generated when any
indicator_type of intelligence data is detected [116], the intelligence dataset
may contain many indicator_types for intelligence data (such as ADDR, DO-
MAIN, CERT_HASH ) and not only FILE_HASH indicator_type. Thus,
the indicator_type in this module is FILE_HASH.
This method is able to detect the malicious file in both cases, uploaded
and downloaded, but MFHD aims to detect only downloaded malicious files.
Therefore, MFHD checks if the connection is oriented to a host from the
monitored network. This is done by checking the connection destination
IP address through is_local_addr function mentioned in Section 5.1.1 on
page 73. Before raising an alert, MFHD checks if an alert regarding the
same host and for the same file hash has been generated during the previous
24 hours to avoid sending several alerts about the same set (host, hash)
during one day. For this reason, MFHD checks if the current set exists in
t_suppress_hash_alert table, this table contains all detected sets during the
previous day.
MFHD then generates hash_alert event, writes the malicious connection
information into a specific log blacklist_detection_hash.log, sends an alert
email regarding the malicious file hash detection to RT and adds the current
detected set (host, hash) into t_suppress_hash_alert table. The written







5.1.3 Implementation of the Malicious Domain Name
Detection Module (MDND)
Algorithm 3 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the MDND module.
MFHD makes use of Bro Intelligence Framework mentioned in Section 5.1 on
page 69. In this module, the intelligence framework is configured to monitor
all the domain names which are seen in DNS query requests traffic. This
framework is connected to blacklist.intel text file, which contains the domain
names blacklist.
Algorithm 3 Implementation pseudo-code of MDND
1: Get malicious domain names blacklist (blacklist.intel)
2: Filter DNS traffic
3: Extract DNS query requests
4: Extract the query (the requested domain name)
5: Send domain name to Bro Intelligence Framework
6: if domain name is in blacklist.intel then
7: if the connection is established by a host from the monitored
8: network then




13: Generate an event (domain_alert)
14: Write domain_alert into blacklist_detection_domain.log
15: Send an alert email to RT










The network traffic is processed and filtered into DNS traffic; MDND
then extracts all DNS query requests. All domain names which are discovered
in DNS traffic are sent to the intelligence framework where its presence should
be checked within the intelligence dataset (blacklist.intel text file). When a
piece of intelligence data, which in this instance is the malicious domain
name, is detected, the intelligence framework generates Intel::match event
mentioned in Section 5.1.2 on page 76. The indicator_type in this module
is DOMAIN. Following this, MDND checks if the connection is established
by a host from the monitored network, therefore, the connection source IP
address is checked through the is_local_addr function. Before raising an
alert, MDND checks if an alert regarding the same host and for the same
malicious domain name has been generated during the last day, for this
purpose, t_suppress_domain_alert table is checked.
MDND then generates domain_alert event, writes the malicious con-
nection information into a specific log blacklist_detection_domain.log, sends
an alert email regarding the malicious domain name detection to RT and
adds the current detected set (host, domain) into t_suppress_domain_alert







5.1.4 Implementation of the Malicious IP Address De-
tection Module (MIPD)
Algorithm 4 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the MIPD module.
The network traffic is processed; this module waits for new_connection event
to be generated by Bro. This event is generated for every new connection and
it is raised with the first packet of a previously unknown connection [117].
Algorithm 4 Implementation pseudo-code of MIPD
1: Get malicious IP addresses blacklist (t_ip_blacklist table)
2: Get new_connection event
3: Check if the connection is to a malicious IP:
4: if the connection destination IP is in t_ip_blacklist then
5: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored network
6: then
7: if the same ip_alert has been generated over the last day
8: then
9: goto Check if the connection is from a malicious IP:
10: else
11: Generate an event (ip_alert)
12: Write ip_alert into blacklist_detection_ip.log
13: Send an alert email to RT
14: Suppress the same ip_alert over the next day
15: end if
16: else
17: goto Check if the connection is from a malicious IP:
18: end if
19: else
20: goto Check if the connection is from a malicious IP:
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21: end if
22: Check if the connection is from a malicious IP:
23: if the connection source IP is in t_ip_blacklist then
24: if the connection destination IP belongs to the monitored
25: network then




30: Generate an event (ip_alert)
31: Write ip_alert into blacklist_detection_ip.log
32: Send an alert email to RT









Through new_connection event, MIPD checks both connection sides’
IP addresses to detect if the connection is to or from a malicious IP. If
the connection destination IP exists in t_ip_blacklist table, this means, the
connection is to a malicious IP. MIPD then checks the connection source IP
through the is_local_addr function to determine if the connection is estab-
lished by a host from the monitored network. When a malicious connection is
detected and before raising an alert, MIPD checks the t_suppress_ip_alert
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table to determine if the same ip_alert has been generated within the last
day. MIPD then generates ip_alert event, writes the malicious connection
information into a specific log blacklist_detection_ip.log, sends an alert email
regarding the malicious IP detection to RT and adds the current detected







When the connection is from a malicious IP, the same procedure, when
the connection is to a malicious IP, is followed paying attention to the source
and destination IP addresses as shown in Algorithm 4.
5.1.5 Implementation of the Malicious SSL Certificate
Detection Module (MSSLD)
As the blacklist consists of two forms of malicious SSL certificates (SHA1
fingerprints and serial & subject), two methods are followed for malicious
SSL certificate detection. The first one is intelligence-based MSSLD, shown
in Algorithm 5, and the second method is event-based MSSLD, shown in
Algorithm 6.
In the intelligence-based MSSLD, the Bro Intelligence Framework is
used and configured to monitor all secure connections SSL certificates’
hashes. This framework is connected to blacklist.intel file, which contains
the SSL certificate blacklist. After extracting all secure connections traffic,
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Algorithm 5 Implementation pseudo-code of intelligence-based MSSLD
1: Get malicious SSL certificates hashes blacklist (blacklist.intel)
2: Filter secure connections traffic
3: Extract SSL certificate hash
4: Send SSL certificate hash to Bro Intelligence Framework
5: if SSL certificate hash is in blacklist.intel then
6: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored network
7: then
8: if the same ssl_alert had not been generated over the last
9: day then
10: Generate an event (ssl_alert)
11: Write ssl_alert into blacklist_detection_ssl.log
12: Send an alert email to RT
13: Suppress the same ssl_alert over the next day
14: end if
15: else if the connection destination IP belongs to the monitored
16: network then
17: if the same ssl_alert had not been generated over the last
18: day then
19: Generate an event (ssl_alert)
20: Write ssl_alert into blacklist_detection_ssl.log
21: Send an alert email to RT









SSL certificates hashes are passed to the intelligence framework to be checked
against the intelligence data set blacklist.intel. When a match with any in-
dicator_type of the intelligence data is found, the intelligence framework
generates an Intel::match event. Through this event, if the indicator_type
is CERT_HASH, it means this connection has a malicious SSL certificate.
Next, both connection sides, source and destination IP addresses, are checked
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Algorithm 6 Implementation pseudo-code of event-based MSSLD
1: Get malicious SSL certificates [serials and subjects] (bad_ssl group)
2: Filter secure connections traffic
3: Get x509_certificate event
4: Extract SSL certificate [serial and subject]
5: if SSL certificate [serial and subject] is in bad_ssl then
6: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored network
7: then
8: if the same ssl_alert had not been generated over the last
9: day then
10: Generate an event (ssl_alert)
11: Write ssl_alert into blacklist_detection_ssl.log
12: Send an alert email to RT
13: Suppress the same ssl_alert over the next day
14: end if
15: else if the connection destination IP belongs to the monitored
16: network then
17: if the same ssl_alert had not been generated over the last
18: day then
19: Generate an event (ssl_alert)
20: Write ssl_alert into blacklist_detection_ssl.log
21: Send an alert email to RT









through the is_local_addr function to check if the connection is established
to or from the monitored network. To avoid raising the same alert within
the same day, the t1_suppress_ssl_alert table is checked to ensure that it
does not contain the same detected [host IP address, SSL certificate hash]
set.
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MSSLD then generates ssl_alert event, writes the malicious con-
nection information into a specific log blacklist_detection_ssl.log, sends
an alert email regarding the malicious SSL certificate detection to RT
and adds the current detected set [host IP address, SSL certificate hash]







In the event-based MSSLD, the network traffic is processed and filtered
into secure connections traffic, and then x509_certificate event can be gen-
erated for encountered X509 certificates [118]. Through this event, the serial
and subject of the X509 certificate are checked for the certificate presence
in the bad_ssl group. This group contains many of serials and subjects
of malicious X509 certificates. If a match is found, the module should de-
termine if the connection is established to or from one of the monitored
network hosts; accordingly, both the source and destination IP addresses are
checked through is_local_addr function. Before an ssl_alert is raised, the
t2_suppress_ssl_alert table is to be checked to ensure that the same alert
was not raised previously during the same day.
In conforming CA certificates, the value of the subject key identifier
must be the value placed in the key identifier field of the authority key iden-
tifier extension of certificates issued by the subject of this certificate. Appli-
cations are not required to verify that key identifiers match when performing
certification path validation. Therefore, matching the serial and subject of
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the X509 certificate, regardless the certificate version, should be effective to
detect the malicious activities.
As in the previous intelligence-based method, MSSLD generates
ssl_alert event, writes the malicious connection information into a specific
log blacklist_detection_ssl.log, sends an alert email regarding the malicious
SSL certificate detection to RT and adds the current detected set [host IP
address, SSL certificate hash] into t2_suppress_ssl_alert table.
5.1.6 Implementation of the Domain Flux Detection
Module (DFD)
Algorithm 7 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the DFD module.
DNS traffic is extracted and processed; this module waits for dns_message
event to be generated by Bro. This event is generated for any DNS message
and provides information regarding the connection to DNS server [119].
Through dns_massage event, DFD checks for two conditions: (1) If
this connection is established by a host from the monitored network us-
ing the is_local_addr function; (2) If the dns_message is due to DNS er-
ror of NXDOMAIN. A NXDOMAIN code means that the domain name
does not exist, either not registered or invalid. This information can be
extracted from dns_message event (c$dns$rcode_name=="NXDOMAIN").
If the two conditions are met, the source IP address, which queries for un-
registered domain names, is saved in the t_dns_failure table. This table
counts DNS query failures of the same IP address. If the current IP ad-
dress exists in the t_dns_failure table, the counter is increased by one (++
t_dns_failure[c$id$orig_h]).
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Algorithm 7 Implementation pseudo-code of DFD
1: Get dns_failure_threshold
2: Extract DNS traffic
3: Get dns_message event
4: if the connection is established by a host from the monitored
5: network then
6: if dns_message event is due to DNS error of NXDOMAIN then
7: if the host IP is not in t_dns_failure table then
8: write host IP into t_dns_failure
9: host IP counter ← 1
10: else
11: Increase host IP counter by 1
12: if host IP counter > dns_failure_threshold then
13: Delete host IP from t_dns_failure
14: Reset host IP counter to zero
15: if the same domain_flux_alert has been generated
16: over the last day then
17: goto End
18: else
19: Generate an event (domain_flux_alert)
20: Write domain_flux_alert into domain_flux.log
21: Send an alert email to RT















When the number of DNS query failures exceeds the specified thresh-
old, dns_failure_threshold, the current IP address is deleted from the
t_dns_failure table to be removed from the counting, i.e. to reset the counter
of this IP address to zero. The threshold is set to 50 DNS query failures per
5 minutes based on the fact that recent malware can generate 50,000 domain
names every day [120]. Then, if the IP address of the potentially infected
host does not exist in the t_suppress_domain_flux_alert table, to prevent
more than one alert regarding the same IP address per day, DFD writes the






DFD also generates domain_flux_alert event, sends an alert email re-
garding the domain flux detection to RT and adds the current detected host
IP address into t_suppress_domain_flux_alert table.
5.1.7 Implementation of the Scan Detection Module
(SD)
The SD module makes use of bro.scan function, which is shipped by de-
fault with Bro [121]. bro.scan detects if an attacking host appears to be
scanning a single victim host on several ports (port scanning). It also de-
tects if a host appears to be scanning a number of destinations on a single
port (address scanning). The detection is based on tracking all failed con-
nection attempts over a specific time interval [122], and depends on four
events: (1) connection_attempt, generated for an unsuccessful connection
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attempt [123]; (2) connection_rejected, generated for a rejected TCP con-
nection [124]; (3) connection_reset, generated when an endpoint aborted
a TCP connection [125]; and (4) connection_pending, generated for each
still-open TCP connection when Bro terminates [126].
SD uses the same script as bro.scan and only minor modifications are
made on it to generate scan_alert event, write the malicious connection
information into a specific log scan_detection.log and send an alert email to
RT.
5.1.8 Implementation of the Tor Connection Detection
Module (TorCD)
Algorithm 8 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the TorCD mod-
ule. The network traffic is processed; this module waits for connec-
tion_established event to be generated by Bro. This event is generated
when a SYN-ACK packet is seen in response to a SYN packet during a TCP
handshake [127].
Algorithm 8 Implementation pseudo-code of TorCD
1: Get Tor servers list (t_tor_server table)
2: Get connection_established event
3: Check if the connection is to a Tor network:
4: if the connection destination IP is in t_tor_server then
5: if the connection source IP belongs to the monitored network
6: then
7: if the same tor_alert has been generated over the last day
8: then
9: goto Check if the connection is from a Tor network:
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10: else
11: Generate an event (tor_alert)
12: Write tor_alert into tor_detection.log
13: Send an alert email to RT
14: Suppress the same tor_alert over the next day
15: end if
16: else
17: goto Check if the connection is from a Tor network:
18: end if
19: else
20: goto Check if the connection is from a Tor network:
21: end if
22: Check if the connection is from a Tor network:
23: if the connection source IP is in t_tor_server then
24: if the connection destination IP belongs to the monitored
25: network then




30: Generate an event (tor_alert)
31: Write tor_alert into tor_detection.log
32: Send an alert email to RT










TorCD is able to detect the Tor connections in both cases, to or from
a Tor network. However, this module aims to detect only connections
from the monitored network to a Tor network. Therefore, through con-
nection_established event, TorCD checks if the connection destination IP
exists in t_tor_server table, this means, the connection is to a Tor network.
The module then checks the connection source IP through the is_local_addr
function to determine if the connection is established by a host from the mon-
itored network. Following this, as in previous modules, tor_alert event is







This module considers any connection to a Tor entrance node is a suspi-
cious one. Nonetheless, this alert is not considered as an attack till it is cor-
related with another step of APT. Furthermore, there are around 21 anony-
mous networks [128]. However, Tor network is the most commonly used one
by malware. Detecting the connections to other anonymous networks can
be achieved using this module by adding their nodes’ IPs to t_tor_server
table.
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5.2 Implementation of the FCI Correlation
Framework
The FCI framework is implemented in two versions. The first one is imple-
mented on top of Bro to be used on live traffic for real time detection; it can
be also used offline on PCAP (Packet Capture) files. The second version is
implemented in Python [129] to be used offline on saved alerts’ logs. Using
FCI offline-version is useful when having a PCAP file for a network which is
not monitored by Bro.
5.2.1 Implementation of the Alerts Filter (AF) Module
Algorithm 9 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the AF module. When
Algorithm 9 Implementation pseudo-code of AF
1: Get the correlation_time
2: Get t_detection_modules_alerts table
3: Get a new alert from one of the detection modules
4: if the new alert is in t_detection_modules_alerts then
5: Ignore the new alert
6: else
7: write the new alert into t_detection_modules_alerts
8: Send the new alert to AC
9: end if
10: End
generating a new alert by one of the detection modules, the AF module checks
t_detection_modules_alerts table to determine if the same alert has been
generated within the last correlation_time. t_detection_modules_alerts ta-
ble contains all alerts which have been generated by the detection modules
and sent to AC within the last correlation_time. Thus, AF either (1) ig-
nores the new alert, if it is a repeated one; or (1) sends the new alert
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to AC, to be processed and clustered, and (2) writes the new alert into
t_detection_modules_alerts table where it is saved for the next correla-
tion_time.
5.2.2 Implementation of the Alerts Clustering (AC)
Module
All produced APT clusters are recorded into a specific dataset, the clus-
tered_dataset, to be consumed by the next module, namely the correlation
indexing module. The clustering algorithm dataset "clustered_dataset" con-
sists of clusters. Each cluster contains a maximum of four alerts and each
alert represents one of the APT detectable steps:
1. alert_1 ∈ {𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑒𝑥𝑒_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡, ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡}.
2. alert_2 ∈ {𝑖𝑝_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑠𝑠𝑙_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡}.
3. alert_3 ∈ {𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑛_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡}.
4. alert_4 ∈ {𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡}.
Algorithm 10 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the AC mod-
ule. Alert clustering can affect the performance of the correlation indexing
and the prediction module as well. For this reason, the first function of
CI, evaluating the correlations between the cluster’s alerts, mentioned in
Section 4.2.2.3 on page 63, is also implemented within the AC algorithm.
Implementing the first function of CI within AC reduces the computational
cost of the FCI correlation framework, since AC does not classify any new
alert into a cluster unless it is correlated with the cluster alerts, as explained
later in this section.
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Algorithm 10 Implementation pseudo-code of AC and first function of CI
1: Get the time window TW (the correlation time)
2: Get the new alert from AF
3: if new alert == disguised_exe_alert Or new alert == hash_alert
4: Or new alert == domain_alert then
5: goto alert_1 processing engine:
6: else if new alert == ip_alert Or new alert == ssl_alert
7: Or new alert == domain_flux_alert then
8: goto alert_2 processing engine:
9: else if new alert == scan_alert then
10: goto alert_3 processing engine:
11: else if new alert == tor_alert then
12: goto alert_4 processing engine:
13: end if
14:
15: alert_1 processing engine:
16: Start a new cluster
17: Write the new alert into alert_1
18:
19: alert_2 processing engine:
20: for each cluster in the clustered_dataset do
21: if alert_1 != None And alert_2 == None
22: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
23: if time > time_1 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
24: if infected == infected_1 then
25: Add the new alert into the current cluster
26: Write the new alert into alert_2
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27: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
28: Write apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert into
29: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_detection.log
30: Send apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to RT
31: End for loop
32: else
33: goto Next cluster:
34: end if
35: else
36: goto Next cluster:
37: end if
38: else
39: goto Next cluster:
40: end if
41: Next cluster:
42: if the current cluster is the last one in the clustered_dataset then
43: Start a new cluster
44: Write the new alert into alert_2
45: else




50: alert_3 processing engine:
51: for each cluster in the clustered_dataset do
52: if alert_1 != None And alert_2 != None
53: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
54: if time > time_2 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
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55: if infected == infected_2 then
56: Add the new alert into the current cluster
57: Write the new alert into alert_3
58: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert
59: Write apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert into
60: apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_detection.log
61: Send apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert to RT
62: End for loop
63: else
64: goto Next cluster:
65: end if
66: else
67: goto Next cluster:
68: end if
69: else if alert_1 != None And alert_2 == None
70: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
71: if time > time_1 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
72: if infected == infected_1 then
73: Add the new alert into the current cluster
74: Write the new alert into alert_3
75: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
76: Write apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert into
77: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_detection.log
78: Send apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to RT
79: End for loop
80: else




84: goto Next cluster:
85: end if
86: else if alert_1 == None And alert_2 != None
87: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
88: if time > time_2 And time - Time_2 <= TW then
89: if infected == infected_2 then
90: Add the new alert into the current cluster
91: Write the new alert into alert_3
92: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
93: Write apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert into
94: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_detection.log
95: Send apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to RT
96: End for loop
97: else
98: goto Next cluster:
99: end if
100: else
101: goto Next cluster:
102: end if
103: else
104: goto Next cluster:
105: end if
106: Next cluster:
107: if the current cluster is the last one in the clustered_dataset then
108: Start a new cluster
109: Write the new alert into alert_3
110: else
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115: alert_4 processing engine:
116: for each cluster in the clustered_dataset do
117: if alert_1 != None And alert_2 != None
118: And alert_3 != None And alert_4 == None then
119: if time > time_3 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
120: if infected == infected_3 Or infected == scanned then
121: Add the new alert into the current cluster
122: Write the new alert into alert_4
123: Generate an event apt_full_scenario_alert
124: Write apt_full_scenario_alert into
125: apt_full_scenario_detection.log
126: Send apt_full_scenario_alert to RT
127: End for loop
128: else
129: goto Next cluster:
130: end if
131: else
132: goto Next cluster:
133: end if
134: else if alert_1 != None And alert_2 != None
135: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
136: if time > time_2 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
137: if infected == infected_2 then
138: Add the new alert into the current cluster
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139: Write the new alert into alert_4
140: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert
141: Write apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert into
142: apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_detection.log
143: Send apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert to RT
144: End for loop
145: else
146: goto Next cluster:
147: end if
148: else
149: goto Next cluster:
150: end if
151: else if alert_1 != None And alert_2 == None
152: And alert_3 != None And alert_4 == None then
153: if time > time_3 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
154: if infected == infected_3 Or infected == scanned then
155: Add the new alert into the current cluster
156: Write the new alert into alert_4
157: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert
158: Write apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert into
159: apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_detection.log
160: Send apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert to RT
161: End for loop
162: else
163: goto Next cluster:
164: end if
165: else
166: goto Next cluster:
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167: end if
168: else if alert_1 == None And alert_2 != None
169: And alert_3 != None And alert_4 == None then
170: if time > time_3 And time - Time_2 <= TW then
171: if infected == infected_3 Or infected == scanned then
172: Add the new alert into the current cluster
173: Write the new alert into alert_4
174: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert
175: Write apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert into
176: apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_detection.log
177: Send apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert to RT
178: End for loop
179: else
180: goto Next cluster:
181: end if
182: else
183: goto Next cluster:
184: end if
185: else if alert_1 != None And alert_2 == None
186: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
187: if time > time_1 And time - Time_1 <= TW then
188: if infected == infected_1 then
189: Add the new alert into the current cluster
190: Write the new alert into alert_4
191: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
192: Write apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert into
193: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_detection.log
194: Send apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to RT
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195: End for loop
196: else
197: goto Next cluster:
198: end if
199: else
200: goto Next cluster:
201: end if
202: else if alert_1 == None And alert_2 != None
203: And alert_3 == None And alert_4 == None then
204: if time > time_2 And time - Time_2 <= TW then
205: if infected == infected_2 then
206: Add the new alert into the current cluster
207: Write the new alert into alert_4
208: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
209: Write apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert into
210: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_detection.log
211: Send apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to RT
212: End for loop
213: else
214: goto Next cluster:
215: end if
216: else
217: goto Next cluster:
218: end if
219: else if alert_1 == None And alert_2 == None
220: And alert_3 != None And alert_4 == None then
221: if time > time_3 And time - Time_3 <= TW then
222: if infected == infected_3 then
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223: Add the new alert into the current cluster
224: Write the new alert into alert_4
225: Generate an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
226: Write apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert into
227: apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_detection.log
228: Send apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to RT
229: End for loop
230: else
231: goto Next cluster:
232: end if
233: else
234: goto Next cluster:
235: end if
236: else
237: goto Next cluster:
238: end if
239: Next cluster:
240: if the current cluster is the last one in the clustered_dataset then
241: Ignore the new alert
242: else




First, the AC module determines to which one of the APT steps the
new alert, coming from the AF module, belongs. MLAPT can detect four
steps of the APT life cycle, mentioned in Section 4.2.2, Table 4.2 on page 60.
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Based on the new alert step, AC has four processing engines, each engine
processes all alerts which belong to one APT step.
For alert_1 processing engine, the second step of APT is the first de-
tectable step, therefore, as soon as an alert of the second APT step is trig-
gered, AC starts a new cluster and writes the new alert into alert_1.
For alert_2 processing engine, when a new alert for the third step
of APT is triggered, the AC module checks all the clusters in the clus-
tered_dataset. The cluster of interest is the one that has alert_1 and the
other alerts (alert_2, alert_3, alert_4 ) are still missed. For that cluster
of interest, the algorithm checks time attributes: time, the time when the
current processed alert is triggered; and time_1, the time when the alert_1
is triggered. For the new alert to be considered, those time attributes should
meet two conditions: time > time_1 and time - time_1 <= TW ; whereas
TW stands for the time window "correlation time". Following this, the first
function of the CI module checks the infected_host attributes: infected, the
infected host of the current processed alert; and infected_1, the infected
host of alert_1. If both infected host attributes are matched, the current
processed alert is added into the current cluster of interest as alert_2. In
addition, an event apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert is generated and an
alert email is sent to RT informing the network security team regarding this
APT sub scenario detection. When one of the previous checks fails, AC
checks if the current cluster is the last one in the clustered_dataset : if true,
a new cluster is started and the current processed alerts is added as alert_2 ;
if false, the process is to be repeated again for the next cluster.
For alert_3 processing engine, when a new alert for the fifth step of APT
is triggered, AC checks all the clusters in the clustered_dataset. There are
three cases for the cluster of interest: (1) when the cluster has alert_1 and
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alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_3 and alert_4" are missed; (2) when
the cluster has alert_1 and the other alerts "alert_2, alert_3, alert_4" are
missed; (3) and when the cluster has alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_1,
alert_3, alert_4" are missed.
For the first case of cluster of interest, AC checks all time attributes
which should meet two conditions: time > time_2 and time - time_1 <=
TW. Following this, CI checks all infected host attributes that should meet
the condition infected == infected_2, as alert_1 and alert_2 are already
in the cluster so it is guaranteed that infected_1 == infected_2 and there
is no need for the first function of CI to check it. The current processed
alert is then added into the current cluster of interest as alert_3, an event
apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert is generated, and an alert email is sent
to RT informing the network security team regarding this APT sub-scenario
detection. If one of the previous checks is failed, it is checked if the current
cluster is the last one in clustered_dataset : if true, a new cluster is started
and the current processed alerts is added as alert_3 ; if false, the process is
to be repeated again for the next cluster.
For the second and third case of cluster of interest, the process is similar
to the first case, as shown in Algorithm 10, taking into consideration the
corresponded time and infected host attributes.
For alert_4 processing engine, the first step is to find the cluster of
interest in the clustered_dataset. When a new alert for the sixth step of
APT is triggered, AC checks all the clusters in the clustered_dataset. There
are seven cases for the cluster of interest: (1) when the cluster has alert_1,
alert_2, and alert_3, and the last alert "alert_4" is missed; (2) when the
cluster has alert_1 and alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_3 and alert_4"
are missed; (3) when the cluster has alert_1 and alert_3 and the other
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alerts "alert_2 and alert_4" are missed; (4) when the cluster has alert_2
and alert_3 and the other alerts "alert_1 and alert_4" are missed; (5) when
the cluster has alert_1 and the other alerts "alert_2, alert_3, and alert_4"
are missed; (6) when the cluster has alert_2 and the other alerts "alert_1,
alert_3, and alert_4" are missed; (7) and when the cluster has alert_3 and
the other alerts "alert_1, alert_2, and alert_4" are missed.
The process of all cases of cluster of interest in alert_4 processing engine
is similar to the process in alert_3 processing engine explained above. The
AC algorithm checks all time attributes of the cluster; after that, the CI al-
gorithm checks all infected host and scanned host attributes; if all conditions
"presented in Algorithm 10" are met, the current processed alert is added into
the current cluster of interest as alert_4. Based on the cluster of interest,
three events can be generated as an output of alert_4 processing engine:
apt_full_scenario_alert for case 1; apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert
for cases 2, 3, and 4; and apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert for cases 5,
6, and 7. In addition, an alert email is sent to RT informing the network
security team regarding this APT full or sub-scenario detection. If one of
the algorithms’ conditions fails, the process moves to the next cluster in
clustered_dataset or it is ended if the current cluster is the last one.
5.2.3 Implementation of the Correlation Indexing (CI)
Module
The first function of CI, evaluating the correlations between the cluster’s
alerts, is implemented within AC algorithm, as explained in the previous
Section 5.2.2 on page 94. The implementation of the second function of CI,
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calculating the correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 for each cluster by the end of the
correlation window, is shown in Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11 Implementation pseudo-code of the second function of CI
1: Get the clustered_dataset
2: for each cluster in the clustered_dataset do
3: if infected_2 == infected_1 then
4: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏 ← 1
5: else
6: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏 ← 0
7: end if
8: if infected_3 == infected_2 Or infected_3 == infected_1 then
9: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 ← 1
10: else
11: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 ← 0
12: end if
13: if infected_4 == scanned Or infected_4 == infected_3
14: Or infected_4 == infected_2 Or infected_4 == infected_1 then
15: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑 ← 1
16: else
17: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑 ← 0
18: end if
19: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 == 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑏 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑐 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑑




To calculate 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 for each cluster, the CI module makes use of the
attributes of each alert in the cluster, applies the correlation rules mentioned
in Section 4.2.2.3 on page 63, and calculates the correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑
based on the equation 4.3 mentioned also in Section 4.2.2.3 on page 65 .
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5.3 Implementation of the Prediction Module
(PM)
The PM module uses machine learning techniques to achieve its functional-
ity. The process in this module undergoes three main steps: (1) Preparing
the dataset, implemented in Python; (2) Training the prediction model, im-
plemented in MATLAB [130]; and (3) Using the model for prediction, in
Python and MATLAB.
5.3.1 Preparing the Machine Learning Dataset
Building the machine_learning_dataset is based on the correlation_dataset,
which is the output of the FCI correlation framework over a period of six
months or more. The correlation_dataset contains the correlated clusters,
both full and sub APT scenarios, and the correlation index 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 for each
cluster. To prepare the machine_learning_dataset, PM makes the following
modifications on the correlation_dataset :
∙ The prediction of apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert to complete the
APT life cycle is based on the first two detectable steps of APT, there-
fore, only the clusters containing at least alerts for the first two de-
tectable steps, i.e. alert_1 and alert_2, are kept; the other clusters
are filtered out of the correlation_dataset.
∙ Based on the 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 value, the correlation_dataset clusters can be
classified into four classes: Class 3, for APT full scenario and the clus-
ter has four correlated alerts; Class 2, for APT sub-scenario and the
cluster has three correlated alerts; Class 1, for APT sub-scenario and
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the cluster has two correlated alerts; and Class 0, the cluster has only
one alert. The machine_learning_dataset contains only two classes:
Class 1 for APT full scenario; and Class 0, for uncompleted APT
scenario. Thus, the PM module considers: (1) Class 3, in the cor-
relation_dataset, as Class 1, for the machine_learning_dataset ; and
(2) Classes 2, 1, and 0, in the correlation_dataset, as Class 0, for the
machine_learning_dataset.
∙ The class prediction is based on the first two detectable steps of APT,
therefore, all the columns related to the third and fourth detectable
alerts, i.e. alert_3 and alert_4 attributes, are filtered out of the cor-
relation_dataset.
∙ Since the chosen machine learning classifiers work with numeric values,
columns which are not numeric in the correlation_dataset are repre-
sented in a numerical format for the machine_learning_dataset. The
alert_type values are mapped to numbers from 1 to 6, and the columns
which contain IPs values (src_ip_1, dest_ip_1, infected_host_1,
src_ip_2, dest_ip_2, infected_host_2 ) are mapped to numeric values
using socket [131] and struct.unpack [132] functions built in Python.
5.3.2 Training the Prediction Model
As the task is to predict classes, classification methods are chosen and differ-
ent machine learning algorithms are applied on machine_learning_dataset
to train the model. The model is trained using four machine learning ap-
proaches, commonly used for classification problems, which are: decision
tree learning, support vector machine, k-nearest neighbours and ensemble
learning. Those ML approaches are previously explained in Section 2.3.1 on
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page 23. The prediction accuracy of each trained model is calculated and
the best model, which has the highest prediction accuracy, is chosen. The
best model is saved to be used by the network security team.
5.3.3 Using the Model for Prediction
When a new apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert is generated by the corre-
lation framework, the new data, i.e. the cluster attributes, is prepared as
explained above in Section 5.3.1 on page 108, then the prediction model,
which has been trained and chosen in the previous step, is applied.
As a result, the network security team can determine the probability
of the current alert to complete the APT life cycle, and apply the required
procedure to stop the attack before completion and achieving the final aim
of data exfiltraition.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presents the MLAPT implementation. The Bro’s scripting
language is used in the implementation of all detection modules. The FCI
correlation framework is implemented in two versions. The first one is im-
plemented on top of Bro to be used on live traffic for real time detection; it
can also be used offline on PCAP files. The second version is built in Python
to be used offline on saved alerts’ logs. The prediction module PM makes
use of Python and Matlab to achieve its functionality.
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All blacklists of blacklist-based detection modules are automatically
updated based on different intelligence feeds at once. The MLAPT de-
tection modules consume and handle some of Bro events, can gener-
ate eight events (alerts), send alert emails to RT and write alerts in-
formation into specific logs. Those detection modules’ alerts are fed
to the FCI correlation framework to be filtered, clustered, and the
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 is calculated for each cluster. FCI can generate three types
of alerts: apt_full_scenario_alert, apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
and apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert. FCI writes all the corre-
lated clusters along with the 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 of each cluster into the correla-
tion_dataset. Based on the correlation_dataset, the PM module prepares
machine_learning_dataset, applies different machine learning algorithms to





In this chapter, the evaluation of MLAPT is introduced and the achieved
results are presented. As MLAPT consists of three main phases: threat de-
tection, alert correlation and attack prediction; the evaluation of MLAPT
undergoes the evaluation of the three phases respectively. Additionally, a
comparison between the developed system MLAPT and other existing sys-
tems is provided.
6.1 Evaluation Metrics
Two main measures should be taken into consideration when evaluating
MLAPT, the first one is the detection/prediction accuracy and the second




To determine the detection accuracy of MLAPT, True Positive Rate (TPR)
and False Positive Rate (FPR) are calculated for the detection modules and
the correlation framework. Effective IDS can differentiate between real at-
tacks and normal traffic. In general, four different results can be returned by
an IDS: True Positive (TP), when an attack is predicted as an attack; False
Positive (FP), when normal traffic is predicted as an attack; False Nega-
tive (FN), when an attack is predicted as normal traffic; and True Negative
(TN), when normal traffic is predicted as normal traffic. In the literature,
the efficiency of IDS is commonly measured by the false positive and false
negative alarm rates [133]. The Recall (R) or True Positive Rate (TPR) is
the proportion of correctly predicted attacks to the actual size of the attack,





The Specificity is the proportion of correctly predicted normal traffic to





The False Positive Rate (FPR) or false alarm rate, is calculated using
the equation 6.3:




To determine the prediction accuracy of MLAPT, two measures of the
prediction module are calculated: (1) the prediction accuracy which is the
proportion of correct predictions, defined in equation 6.4; and (2) the con-
fusion matrix [134] which gives more detailed analysis than the prediction
accuracy, described in Table 6.1.
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
(6.4)










The processing speed is a significant feature of MLAPT. Even a high-quality
IDS is not effective if its processing cost is too high, since the resulting loss
of packets increases the probability that an attack is not detected. The
processing load exerted by this algorithm depends on the characteristics of
the rules as well as on the network traffic. Rules generally fall into one of
two categories, depending on whether they apply to the packet header or
the payload. Header rules inspect the packet header in an attempt to detect
specific combinations of features, such as the source and destination address,
port numbers, checksums or sequence numbers. Payload rules attempt to
match a specific byte sequence in a packet’s payload. IDS rules may also
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combine header and payload specific match conditions. Since header size is
generally fixed, the processing cost of applying header rules is nearly constant
for each packet regardless of actual packet size, while the cost of payload
rules scales with the packet size [135]. The processing speed of MLAPT can
be calculated by a comparison between the real time of the attack and the
detection time of the attack reported by one of the detection modules and
the correlation framework.
6.2 Experimental Evaluation of MLAPT
6.2.1 Evaluation of the Detection Modules
Two main methods were used to evaluate the detection modules. In the
first one, the detection modules were applied on pcap files which contain
malicious traffic. Each pcap file was provided by a different third party,
pcap file size and data source are mentioned in the evaluation section of
each detection module. In the second evaluation method, Bro was installed
on an experimental server (2x 4-core Intel Xeon CPU E5530 @ 2.40 GHz, 12
GB RAM) with passive access to part of the university campus live traffic
(200 Mbps, 200 users, 550 nodes) via an optical TAP (Test Access Port).
The detection modules were run on the experimental server and the network
was monitored for one month.
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6.2.1.1 Evaluation of the Disguised exe File Detection Module
(DeFD)
To evaluate the effectiveness of the DeFD module, a download of disguised
exe file was simulated via the campus network. An experimental server was
set up, using Bro, to passively monitor the campus live traffic. DeFD was run
on that experimental server for the purpose of disguised exe file detection.
Two exe files were randomly selected, SkypeSetup.exe and ViberSetup.exe,
and their names’ extensions (exe) were changed into pdf and doc extensions,
i.e. SkypeSetup.pdf and ViberSetup.doc respectively. The two disguised exe
files were uploaded to the speedyshare.com public server. Then a host work-
ing on a computer connected to the Internet through the monitored network
was used to connect to that public server and download the modified files.
As shown in Figure 6.1, DeFD was able to detect both malicious downloads
and write the information regarding each connection into a specific log.
#fields timestamp     alert_type                orig_h               orig_p resp_h         resp_p infected_host malicious_file
#types time              string                      addr                 port    addr            port     addr               string
1407424021.202210  disguised_exe_alert 147.251.17.197 56973 207.244.73.42 80 147.251.17.197 SkypeSetup.pdf
1407424040.255414  disguised_exe_alert 147.251.17.197 53105 207.244.73.42 80 147.251.17.197 ViberSetup.doc
#close 2014-08-07-19-15-07
Figure 6.1: The log produced by the DeFD module.
This experiment was repeated a hundred of times using different dis-
guised exe files with different extensions. DeFD was able to detect all the
malicious files, the average detection delay was 270 ms with a standard de-
viation of 54 ms.
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6.2.1.2 Evaluation of the Malicious File Hash Detection Module
(MFHD)
To evaluate the effectiveness of the MFHD module, two experiments were
performed. In the first one, MFHD was applied on a pcap file which contains
traffic infected by the Nuclear EK malware, which has an MD5 file hash value
of dc5c71aef24a5899f63c3f9c15993697 [136]. This pcap file was analysed by
the provider and the ground truth was known. The infection was delivered
by drive-by download attack and five malicious IPs were involved. MFHD
successfully detected the malicious file Nuclear EK malware and identified
the connection over which the malware was downloaded. Note that the
ground truth blacklist was not provided to MFHD. Figure 6.2 shows part of
blacklist_detection_hash.log produced by MFHD. The log file contains more
information regarding the malicious connection than given in the figure, such
as the source IP address, source and destination ports, but the figure shows






Figure 6.2: Part of the log produced by the MFHD module.
In the second evaluation experiment, the campus live traffic was moni-
tored to detect hosts involved in downloading malicious files. MFHD was set
up to create a log file of detected malicious file hashes. MFHD was run on
the experimental server mentioned before in Section 6.2.1 on page 116. The
monitoring was done for one month. The list of hosts involved in download-
ing malicious files was matched with the results of a malicious IP address
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detection module. As shown in Figure 6.3, 19 hosts were detected by MFHD,
involved in downloading malicious files; and 37 hosts were detected by MIPD,
involved in malicious IP address connections. Within detected hosts, 12 were
detected involved in both malicious IP connection and downloading malicious



















Figure 6.3: Detected hosts by the MFHD and MIPD modules.
MFHD also sent an alert email, in real time, regarding each malicious
file hash detection to RT; where the network security team can perform
additional forensics and respond to it. Figure 6.4 shows an example of a
Malicious_Hash ticket, which was emailed to RT.
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Greetings,
the security team CSIRT-MU detected involvement of the IP address
147.251.17.197 into the following incident:
Incident type: Malicious_Hash
Time of detection: 2014-12-10 14:43:18 +0100
IP address: 147.251.17.197
Domain name: ---
Details of this incident can be found at this address:
https://reports.csirt.muni.cz/A4FE72DC-65A8-1C74-8627-5664BE78D651
Best regards,
CSIRT-MU, the security team
            Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:43:36 +0100
Figure 6.4: An example of a Malicious_Hash ticket.
6.2.1.3 Evaluation of the Malicious Domain Name Detection
Module (MDND)
Three evaluation experiments were performed to test the MDND module in
terms of effectiveness and real time detection. In the first one, MDND was
applied on a pcap file. This pcap file contains traffic infected by malware
with MD5 hash f73c538c1558b1e02f52743534ca967e [137]. The infection was
delivered by a Neutrino exploit kit (EK) and six domains were involved.
This fact was exploited to set the ground truth. The module consumes the
pcap file and produces a log file. MDND was able to detect five out of six
malicious domains which were involved in that infection while one of those
malicious domains was not included in the module blacklist.intel file. Note
that the ground truth blacklist was not provided to the MDND module.











Figure 6.5: Part of the log produced by the MDND module.
In the second evaluation experiment, the campus live traffic was moni-
tored for malicious domains detection. MDND was run on the experimental
server mentioned before in Section 6.2.1 on page 116. The monitoring was
done for one month. The list of hosts involved in malicious domain con-
nections was matched with the results of a malicious IP address detection
module. As shown in Figure 6.6, 22 hosts involved in malicious domain
connections were detected, by MDND; and 37 hosts involved in malicious
IP address connections were detected, by MIPD. Within detected hosts, 14
were involved in both malicious IP and domain connections, which indicated

















Figure 6.6: Detected hosts by the MDND and MIPD modules.
MDND also sent a real time alert email to report the malicious domain
activities to RT. Figure 6.7 shows an example of a Malicious_Domain ticket
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which was sent by email to RT.
Greetings,
the security team CSIRT-MU detected involvement of the IP address
147.251.17.197 into the following incident:
Incident type: Malicious_Domain
Time of detection: 2014-11-06 16:21:39 +0100
IP address: 147.251.17.197
Domain name: cqufwm.com
Details of this incident can be found at this address:
https://reports.csirt.muni.cz/A4FE72DC-65A8-1C74-8627-5664BE69D651
Best regards,
CSIRT-MU, the security team
            Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:43:36 +0100
Figure 6.7: An example of a Malicious_Domain ticket.
The third evaluation experiment is to evaluate the real time detection
capability of MDND. In this experiment, a script connecting to random
malicious domains from the blacklist was installed on a computer in the
monitored network. MDND was set up to send a report to RT as soon as a
malicious connection was detected. The experiment consisted of the following
steps. First, a script initiated connection to a randomly picked address
from the blacklist of malicious domains. It noted the connection time with
millisecond precision. Second, MDND detected a malicious connection after
the first step and automatically created an RT ticket. Third, the RT ticket
was received and the time of arrival, with millisecond precision, is noted .
Finally, the connection start-up time and the time of RT ticket arrival were
compared to calculate the detection delay. The average detection delay was
found to be 310 ms with a standard deviation of 63 ms. Figure 6.8 shows













Figure 6.8: The real time detection of the MDND module.
6.2.1.4 Evaluation of the Malicious IP Address Detection Module
(MIPD)
Two experiments were performed to evaluate the MIPD module. In the first
evaluation experiment, three datasets each containing traffic carrying differ-
ent malware were used. MIPD was applied on those pcap files which were
analysed by the provider, therefore, the ground truth was known. The first
pcap file contained traffic infected by the malware (PizzaHut_Coupon.exe)
with MD5 hash 191a02952905cc0037753700636c3339 [138]. The infection
was delivered by an email attachment sent by Asprox botnet, which uses
phishing emails and sends fake Pizza Hut emails with the subject line: Free
Pizza. The second pcap file traffic was infected by the malware (Label-CA-
Toronto.exe) with MD5 file hash a6ba2cadc7c6891a5f437b212a18ac52 [139].
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The infection was also delivered by Asprox botnet phishing email, but differ-
ent malicious IP was used. The third pcap file traffic was infected by a piece
of malware with MD5 file hash dc5c71aef24a5899f63c3f9c15993697 [140].
The infection was delivered by drive-by-download attack and five malicious
IPs were involved.
The MIPD module was set up to record the malicious IP connections
into a log file. MIPD was able to detect all malicious IP addresses, which
were involved in the three infections described in the previous paragraph
without the knowledge of the ground truth blacklist. Figures 6.9, 6.10
and 6.11 shows part of blacklist_detection_ip.log produced by MIPD for
each used pcap file. The log file contains other useful information such as

























Figure 6.11: Part of the log produced by the MIPD module for the third
pcap file.
In the second evaluation experiment, as in the previous two detection
modules, the campus live traffic was monitored for malicious IP connections
detection. The detected hosts by MIPD were matched with the detected
ones of the MFHD and MDND modules. The result of this experiment is
presented before in the previous Section 6.2.1.2, Figure 6.3 on page 119 and
Section 6.2.1.3, Figure 6.6 on page 121. MIPD also sent an alert email, in
real time, regarding each malicious IP detection similar to those RT tickets
sent by the previous modules.
6.2.1.5 Evaluation of the Malicious SSL Certificate Detection
Module (MSSLD)
To evaluate the MSSLD module, a virtual Internet-connected network was
built, malware samples were injected into the virtual network, the network
traffic was recorded into pcap files, and then the MSSLD module was applied
on those pcap files.
As illustrated in Figure 6.12, two Windows XP SP3 virtual machines
were connected to a physical consumer-grade router, which provided connec-
tion to the Internet. The virtual machines behaved as physical computers in
a home network and were able to communicate with each other. The Virtual
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machines traffic was recorded into two separate pcap files using the nictrace
VirtualBox functionality [141]. Because no software besides the operating
system and the malware was installed on the virtual machines and the oper-
ating system updates were disabled, the majority of the captured traffic was








Figure 6.12: Topology of the implemented virtual network.
Two malware samples were injected independently into the vir-
tual network for 5 minutes each. The first one is the Tro-
jan.Win32.Inject.sbqz, also known as TorrentLocker, which has MD5 hash
value of aabe2844ee61e1f2969d7a96e1355a99. The second injected malware
sample is the Trojan.Win32.Staser.bazr malware, which has MD5 hash value
of e161a4d2716eb83552d3bd22ce5d603c. The C&C servers for these two mal-
ware uses SSL certificates for communication over https. When the MSSLD
module was applied on the captured pcap files, it successfully detected the








Figure 6.13: Part of a log produced by the MSSLD module.
6.2.1.6 Evaluation of the Domain Flux Detection Module (DFD)
This module was evaluated using two experiments. In the first evaluation
experiment, the DFD module was applied on a pcap file provided by the
Malware Capture Facility Project (MCFP) [142]. MCFP is an effort from
the Czech Technical University ATG Group for capturing, analysing and
publishing real and long-lived malware traffic. The captured network traffic
took place between November 2013 and January 2014 in their capture facility.
After analysing the captured data, MCFP found that a piece of malware
used the domain flux technique to connect to its C&C server. There were a
large group of packets going to the IP address 192.35.51.30, destination port
53/TCP. The content of these packets are DNS requests asking for domains
being generated with a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). DFD was set
up to consume the MCFP pcap file. It was able to detect the domain flux
communications used by that malware and identify the infected host. All
information related to the domain flux technique detection was written into
a specific log as shown in Figure 6.14.
orig_h        orig_p     resp_h             resp_p  infected_host  domain_name
addr           port        addr                port      addr               string
10.0.2.107  29219    192.35.51.30    53        10.0.2.107      ndyotrc.com
10.0.2.107  29222    192.35.51.30    53        10.0.2.107      kbzmyrj.net 
10.0.2.107  29225    192.35.51.30    53        10.0.2.107      asptecbd.ru
10.0.2.107  29228    192.35.51.30    53        10.0.2.107      yrtuqrbuk.cc
Figure 6.14: Part of a log produced by the DFD module.
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In the second evaluation experiment, the virtual network men-
tioned before in Section 6.2.1.5 Figure 6.12 on page 126, was used to
gather data. The HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic malware of MD5 value
fbb354f6773fb81927a59008cd9fd3a6 was executed on one of the virtual ma-
chines for 48 hours and the traffic was recorded into a pcap file. Through
manual traffic analysis, it was found that the infected machine proceeded
to use the domain flux technique to connect to the C&C servers over ports
1778, 3363, 3478 and 3479. The DFD module was applied on the captured
pcap file, and the domain flux was detected and written into a log similar to
that one shown in Figure 6.14.
6.2.1.7 Evaluation of the Tor Connection Detection Module
(TorCD)
Three evaluation experiments were used to evaluate the TorCD module in
terms of effectiveness and real time detection. In the first evaluation ex-
periment, TorCD was applied on six pcap files with total size of 31.6 MB.
Those pcap files contain recorded traffic of Trojan.Tbot (Skynet Tor Botnet)
malware, which uses Tor network to communicate with its C&C centre [143].
All pcap files had been analysed by the third party, so the ground truth was
already known. All Tor connections were detected and Figure 6.15 shows
part of the log produced by the TorCD module.
In the second evaluation experiment, the Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.qvcn
malware of MD5 hash value 52d3b26a03495d02414e621ee4d0c04e) was run
on the virtual network, described in Section 6.2.1.5 Figure 6.12 on page 126,
for ten hours and the traffic was recorded into a pcap file. It was found
that the malware communicated solely through the Tor network and did not










Figure 6.15: Part of a log produced by the TorCD module.
connections to 67 addresses belonging to the Tor network and transferred
3698 kB of data. The flow of data dropped for the remaining time, but
new connections were still made. These findings were used to establish the
ground truth. TorCD was applied on the captured pcap file and all Tor
connections were detected and written into a log similar to that one shown
in Figure 6.15.
In the third evaluation experiment, the campus live traffic was moni-
tored for Tor connections detection. TorCD was run on the experimental
server, mentioned before in Section 6.2.1 on page 116, and the monitoring
was done for one month. The list of hosts involved in Tor connections was
matched with the results of domain flux detection module. 14 hosts were
detected by TorCD, involved in Tor connections, and 7 hosts were detected
by DFD, involved in domain flux connections. Within the detected hosts,
5 were involved in both Tor and domain flux connections, which indicated
that they were infected with malware. The TorCD module also sent an alert
email, in real time, regarding each Tor connection detection similar to those
RT tickets sent by the previous modules.
In the end of the detection modules evaluation section, it was found
that: (1) When the detection modules is applied on the pcap files, either
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the files provided by the third parties or the ones captured through the
implemented virtual network mentioned in Section 6.2.1.5 Figure 6.12 on
page 126, all the MLAPT detection modules, apart from MDND, were able
to detect the malicious connections with a true positive rate (TPR) of 100%
and a false positive rate (FPR) of 0%. In the first evaluation experiment of
MDND, the module was able to detect five out of six malicious domains while
missed one malicious domain which was not included in the MDND module
blacklist, i.e. TPR is 83% and FPR is 0%. For this reason, all blacklists of
the blacklist-based detection modules are automatically updated every day
based on different intelligence feeds at once. (2) When the detection modules
were run on the experimental server, mentioned in Section 6.2.1 on page 116,
for the live traffic monitor, all the MLAPT detection modules were able to
detect and report the malicious connections in real time.
6.2.2 Evaluation of the FCI Correlation Framework
In the absence of any publicly available data which contains APT attack
traffic, which can be used in the evaluation of the FCI framework. We had
to build a new dataset which contains APT attack traffic. Using the campus
network to gather attack data does not guarantee capturing any APT attack
traffic against the monitored network.
The aim of the correlation framework is to identify different alerts raised
by the various detection modules, which could be correlated and belong
to one APT attack scenario. To effectively evaluate the FCI correlation
framework, a dataset containing many of the detection modules alerts, in
which some of those alerts belong to APT attack scenarios, has been built.
The data is generated to appear as APT attack scenarios were simulated on
the campus network, the techniques used in the APT life cycle were identified
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by the detection modules, and all generated alerts were written into the
simulation dataset. That dataset also contains many of the generated alerts
which do not belong to APT attack scenarios. All the detection modules have
been evaluated on pcap files and on the real live traffic as well, as previously
explained in Section 6.2.1 on page 116. The aim of this experiment is to test
if the FCI correlation framework is able to detect those APT scenarios in
the simulation dataset.
6.2.2.1 Data Generation
A script is written, using Python. This script generates two types of alerts:
(1) Random alerts which do not relate or belong to one APT attack sce-
nario; and (2) Related alerts which belong to a full or sub-APT attack.
Each alert has seven attributes: alert_type, timestamp, src_ip, src_port,
dest_ip, dest_port and the infected_host ; only the scan_alert has the extra
scanned_host attribute.
To generate a random alert, the alert_type is selected randomly from
the set of all 8 detectable alerts, i.e. disguised_exe_alert, hash_alert,
domain_alert, ip_alert, ssl_alert, domain_flux_alert, scan_alert and
tor_alert. The timestamp is assigned a random value between Fri, 01 Jan
2016 00:00:01 GMT and Thu, 30 Jun 2016 23:59:59 GMT. The src_ip is
randomly assigned an IP address on the campus network. The src_port
is selected randomly from the 49152, 65535 range of ports, which are usu-
ally assigned dynamically to client applications when initiating a connec-
tion. The dest_ip value is assigned based on the selected alert_type: If
the alert_type is disguised_exe_alert, hash_alert or ssl_alert, then the
dest_ip can be any valid IP address which is not on the campus network;
if the alert_type is domain_alert or domain_flux_alert, then the dest_ip
Evaluation Results 132
can use an IP address which is on the campus network; if the alert_type
is assigned ip_alert, then the dest_ip can select a random IP address
from the ip_blacklist described in Section 5.1.4 on page 81; if alert_type
is scan_alert, the dest_ip is selected randomly from campus network IP
addresses; and if the alert_type is tor_alert, the dest_ip is selected ran-
domly from tor_server_list mentioned in Section 4.2.1.8 on page 59. The
dest_port is selected based on the selected alert_type: if the alert_type
is disguise_exe_alert or hash_alert, the dest_port should be 80; if the
alert_type is domain_alert or domain_flux_alert, the dest_port should be
53; if the alert_type is ip_alert, ssl_alert or tor_alert, the dest_port should
be 443; and if the alert_type is scan_alert, the dest_port is selected ran-
domly from the 1, 1024 range of ports. The infected_host should be the same
src_ip of the connection. Finally, the scanned_host (only if alert_type is
scan_alert) should be the same dest_ip of the connection.
To generate an APT full-scenario (consisting of 4 correlated alerts) or
sub-scenario (consisting of 2 or 3 correlated alerts), the APT life cycle should
be taken into consideration. Meaning, the generated alerts’ attributes of each
scenario are selected to appear as an APT attack which is simulated through
the campus network.
6.2.2.2 Experimental Setup
To determine the number of random alerts to be generated for the simula-
tion_dataset, the experimental server, previously mentioned in Section 6.2.1
on page 116, was used to monitor part of the university campus network.
All detection modules were run on the experimental server to analyse the
network traffic; the monitoring period and the number of detected alerts
were determined. According to the actual university network size and the
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actual simulation_dataset monitoring period, the number of the generated
random alerts was calculated. The number of the generated APT full- and
sub-scenarios should be suitable to get enough samples for each class in the
machine_learning_dataset previously explained in Section 5.3.1 on page 108.
The network monitoring was conducted via the experimental server for 2
weeks and 9 different alerts were detected by the detection modules. The size
of the monitored network was 550 nodes, while the whole campus network
is 23500 nodes. Meaning, if the whole campus network is monitored for 6
months, 4900 alerts are expected to be detected by the detection modules.
Therefore, 4900 alerts were generated for the simulation_dataset, of which
100 APT full attack (each scenario is 4 correlated alerts) and 50 APT sub-
attack 3 steps (each scenario is 3 correlated alerts); 50 APT sub-scenarios 2
steps (each scenario is 2 correlated alerts); and 4250 random alerts (which
do not relate or belong to APT attack scenarios). The APT life cycle period
was configured to be for a maximum of one week.
Figure 6.16 shows part of the simulation_dataset with examples of 4
random alerts (alerts 1, 2, 3 and 4), one full APT attack (alerts 5, 6, 7
and 8), sub-APT attack with three steps (alerts 9, 10 and 11) and sub-APT
attack with two steps (alerts 12 and 13).
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id alert_type �mestamp src_ip src_port  dest_ip dest_port infected_host scanned_host
1 domain_alert 1452998107 149.170.102.163 63645 149.170.39.93 53 149.170.102.163
2 ip_alert 1464055590 149.170.109.65 56761 84.92.85.198 443 149.170.109.65
3 ssl_alert 1458212586 149.170.119.6 60822 139.182.102.123 443 149.170.119.6
4 tor_alert 1455639999 149.170.146.107 51376 80.81.17.31 443 149.170.146.107
5 domain_alert 1458564234 149.170.8.178 58562 149.170.39.93 53 149.170.8.178
6 ssl_alert 1459065352 149.170.8.178 61127 53.107.134.191 443 149.170.8.178
7 scan_alert 1459110382 149.170.8.178 59094 149.170.185.189 830 149.170.8.178 149.170.185.189
8 tor_alert 1459142888 149.170.8.178 60178 176.31.107.163 443 149.170.8.178
9 ssl_alert 1459761925 149.170.205.136 58469 155.136.118.250 443 149.170.205.136
10 scan_alert 1460181080 149.170.205.136 61518 149.170.227.158 657 149.170.205.136  149.170.227.158
11 tor_alert 1460243277 149.170.205.136 59239 65.110.100.163 443 149.170.205.136
12 hash_alert 1457714526 149.170.233.171 56560 31.189.78.33 80 149.170.233.171
13 ssl_alert 1458163332 149.170.233.171 50074 159.124.176.26 443 149.170.233.171
Figure 6.16: Part of the simulation_dataset.
6.2.2.3 Results and Discussion
The FCI correlation framework was applied on the simulation_dataset. Ta-
ble 6.2 shows the FCI correlation framework detection results. This table
indicates the TPR and the FPR for each studied APT attack, both full and
partial attacks. Among all studied APT attacks, the best TPR results were
for the APT sub-attack two steps scenario, followed by the APT sub-attack
three steps scenario and APT full attack, respectively. The results show that
the higher the number of related alerts, the lower the TPR and the higher
FPR. This is due to the higher possibility of the random alerts to be incor-
rectly clustered when more alerts are to be correlated for APT. By manual
analysis for the results, the incorrect alerts clustering was the main reason
of the false alarms. Some APT attacks were not detected due to some of
the random alerts which were incorrectly clustered and correlated. This can
happen if those random alerts, by chance, meet the clustered and correlation
rules, so one random alert can interfere with a running APT scenario (if the
random alert is triggered for the missed scenario step, for the same infected
host, and within the correlation time) and cause the false positive detection
of APT and false negative detection of the random alert. Besides, a very rare
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case can cause the wrong detection is when two, three or four random alerts
can meet the correlation rules, by chance, and are correlated incorrectly.





TP FP FN TN P N TPR FPR
APT full scenario
(4 steps)
90*4 78*4 12*4 88 4452 400 4500 78% 1%
APT sub-scenario
(3 steps)
65*3 42*3 23*3 24 4681 150 4750 84% 1.4%
APT sub-scenario
(2 steps)
85*2 47*2 38*2 6 4724 100 4800 94% 1.6%
APT full and
sub-scenario
725 532 193 118 4132 650 4250 81.8% 4.5%
Figure 6.17 indicates part of the correlation_dataset showing examples
of the clustered alerts, clustered by the clustering algorithm, and the corre-
lation index of each cluster, calculated by the correlation index algorithm.
cluster_id alert_type_1 alert_type_2 alert_type_3 alert_type_4 correla�on_index
1 disguised_exe_alert ip_alert scan_alert tor_alert 3
2 ssl_alert scan_alert tor_alert 2
3 hash_alert domain_flux_alert scan_alert 2
4 hash_alert ssl_alert 1
5 domain_alert ssl_alert scan_alert tor_alert 3
6 domain_alert 0
7 hash_alert 0
8 domain_alert ip_alert scan_alert tor_alert 3
9 domain_flux_alert scan_alert 1
10 ssl_alert 0
Figure 6.17: Part of the correlation_dataset.
Due to the space limitation, the attributes columns of each alert in
Figure 6.17 are hidden. For example, for the first cluster in Figure 6.17, the
alerts’ attributes and the APT life cycle are shown in Figure 6.18.
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ip_alert: 1453861046
149.170.246.131 54242 -> 98.131.185.136 443
tor_alert: 1454277454
149.170.246.131 57180 -> 178.32.181.96 443
disguised_exe_alert: 1453673061
149.170.246.131 57131 -> 100.95.176.106 80
scan_alert: 1454268536
149.170.246.131 50445 -> 149.170.247.87 989
Figure 6.18: The APT life cycle and alerts’ attributes of the first cluster.
6.2.3 Evaluation of the APT Prediction Module (PM)
To evaluate the PM module, three main steps were followed: (1) Prepar-
ing the machine_learning_dataset ; (2) Training the prediction model; and
(3) Saving the model for prediction.
Using the correlation_dataset, which is the output of the FCI correlation
framework over a period of six months, the machine_learning_dataset is
prepared as explained in Section 5.3.1 on page 108. Figure 6.19 shows part
of machine_learning_dataset, the total number of samples in the dataset is






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As there is no machine learning algorithm which can be regarded as the
best or the optimal one, various experiments should be performed on the
machine_learning_dataset using several machine learning algorithms, and
then a comparison between the trained models is made.
The Matlab’s Classification Learner application [144] is used to train
models to classify the machine_learning_dataset. Automated training is
performed to search for the best classification model type, including deci-
sion trees, support vector machines, nearest neighbours, and ensemble clas-
sification. Those classification algorithms are previously explored in Sec-
tion 2.3.1 on page 23, and the characteristics of each classifier type can be
found in [145]. Cross-validation is used as a validation scheme to examine
the prediction accuracy of each trained model.
Cross-validation is a model assessment technique used to evaluate a
machine learning algorithm’s performance in making predictions on new
datasets which has not been trained on [146]. This is done by partition-
ing a dataset and using a subset to train the algorithm and the remaining
data for testing. Each round of cross-validation involves randomly partition-
ing the original dataset into a training set and a testing set. The training set
is then used to train a supervised learning algorithm and the testing set is
used to evaluate its performance. This process is repeated several times and
the average accuracy is used as a performance indicator. Table 6.3 shows
the prediction accuracy for all investigated classification algorithms used to
train the classification models.
Experimental results show that the best classification algorithm is the
Linear SVM, with a prediction accuracy of 84.8%. This trained model can be
saved by the network security team to be applied on real time traffic when a
new real time apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert is triggered, as previously
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Fine Gaussian SVM 69.4%
Medium Gaussian SVM 80.3%















explained in Section 5.3.3 on page 110. Table 6.4 shows the confusion matrix
for the Linear SVM prediction model with a prediction accuracy of 88.4%
for class 1 and 78.7% for class 0.










6.3 A Performance Analysis of Existing APT
Detection Systems
This section presents a performance analysis of four existing APT detection
systems, and provides a comparison between the developed system MLAPT
and these current systems, as shown in Table 6.5.




































The most effective system in terms of true positive rate is TerminAP-
Tor [70] with a TPR of 100%, previously mentioned in Section 3.3 on page 41.
However, the developers mentioned that TerminAPTor has a high rate of
false positives (although they did not mention the figure of FPR) and needs
to be improved by filtering the false positives. Moreover, this detector re-
quires the alerts to be provided by other systems (agent-based) and cannot
work autonomously. Despite having the lowest false positive rate of 0%, the
C&C-based system [71], presented previously in Section 3.3 on page 42, does
not achieve the real time detection. Furthermore, the authors stated that
the detection can be easily evaded when the infected hosts connect to the
C&C domains while users are surfing the Internet. Additionally, missing
the detection of C&C domains leads to failure in APT detection since this
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system depends on detecting only one step of the APT life cycle. Whilst the
spear phishing based system [72], explored earlier in Section 3.3 on page 43,
has a TPR of 97.2%, the FPR of 14.2% is considerably high. In addition, de-
pending on one step for APT detection leads the system to fail when missing
the spear phishing email detection. This missing can happen when the spear
phishing email does not include any of the tokens which are necessary for
the algorithm process. The context-based system [77], already stated in Sec-
tion 3.3 on page 47, has a significantly high FPR of 27.88% while the TPR
was not provided by the authors. Besides, this framework requires significant
expert knowledge to set up and maintain; and similar to TerminAPTor, it is
an agent-based system and cannot work autonomously.
Having a high rate of true positives is significant. Nevertheless, in-
creasing the amount of true positives means that the false positive rate also
increases. Thus, the balance between TPR and FPR is an essential require-
ment for any detection system. The developed system MLAPT has a suitable
balance between the two values of TPR and FPR with 81.8% and 4.5% re-
spectively. MLAPT can also work autonomously and generate the required
events based on its own detection modules. The generated events covers four
detectable steps of the APT life cycle which reduces the false positives and
gives more possibility of APT detection in case one of the steps is missed.
Furthermore, this system can achieve the real time detection, so it can be
much easier to trace back to the attacker, minimise the damage and prevent
further break-ins. Moreover, to the author’s knowledge, MLAPT is the only
system which can predict APT in its early steps with a prediction accu-




This chapter presents the evaluation of the MLAPT phases. When evalu-
ating the detection modules, all the MLAPT detection modules, apart from
MDND, were able to detect the malicious connections with a true positive
rate (TPR) of 100% and a false positive rate (FPR) of 0%. The MDND
module was able to detect the malicious domain connections with a TPR
of 83% and FPR of 0%. In addition, all the MLAPT detection modules
were able to detect and report the malicious connections in real time. When
evaluating the FCI correlation framework, among all studied APTs, the best
TPR results were for the APT sub-attack two steps scenario with a value of
94%, followed by the APT sub-attack three steps scenario with a value of
84% and APT full attack with a value of 78%, respectively. FCI was able to
detect APTs, both full and partial scenarios, with a TPR of 81.8% and FPR
of 4.5%. When evaluating the APT prediction module, the best classification
algorithm was the Linear SVM, with a prediction accuracy of 84.8%.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Although virus scanners, firewalls and IDPSs are able to detect and prevent
many types of cyber attacks, cyber-criminals in turn have developed more
advanced methods and techniques to intrude into the target’s network and
exploit its resources. APTs target specific organisations, this class of attack
are composed of various stages. The main aim of the APT attack is espionage
and then data exfiltration. Therefore, the APT attack is considered as a new
and more complex version of multi-step attack. Most of the research in the
area of APT detection has focused on analysing already identified APTs or
detecting a particular APT attack uses a specific malware. Some previous
approaches have attempted to detect potential APT attacks. However, the
current APT detection systems face serious shortcomings in several aspects
such as achieving real time detection, detecting all APT attack steps, hav-
ing a suitable balance between false positive and false negative rates, and
correlating of events spanning over a long period of time.
This research aims to develop a novel system to detect and predict APT
attacks. A Machine-Learning-based APT detection system, called MLAPT,
143
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has been developed. MLAPT runs through three main phases: threat detec-
tion, alert correlation and attack prediction. In the first phase, the sniffed
data traffic is scanned to detect possible techniques used in the APT life
cycle. To this end, eight detection modules have been developed and tested;
each module implements a method to detect one technique used in one of
APT steps. These detection modules are as follows: disguised exe file detec-
tion (DeFD), malicious file hash detection (MFHD), malicious domain name
detection (MDND), malicious IP address detection (MIPD), malicious SSL
certificate detection (MSSLD), domain flux detection (DFD), scan detection
(SD), and Tor connection detection (TorCD). The output of this phase is
alerts, also known as events, triggered by the individual modules. In the sec-
ond phase, the alerts raised by the individual detection modules are fed to
the newly designed (FCI) correlation framework. The aim of the correlation
framework is to find alerts could be related and belong to one APT attack
scenario. The process in this phase undergoes three main steps: alerts fil-
ter (AF), to identify redundant or repeated alerts; clustering of alerts (AC),
which most likely belong to the same APT attack scenario; and correlation
indexing (CI), to evaluate the degree of correlation between alerts of each
cluster. The main objective of using the correlation framework is to reduce
the false positive rate of the MLAPT detection system. In the final phase,
a machine-learning-based prediction module (PM) is designed and imple-
mented based on a historical record of the monitored network. This module
can be used by the network security team to determine the probability of
the early alerts to develop a complete APT attack.
In spite of the fact that the detection modules methodologies exist in the
literature, their implementation and validation in real traffic are significant
contributions to the field. The correlation framework and prediction module
are two other major contributions in this work.
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Bro scripting language is used in the implementation of all detection
modules. The FCI correlation framework is implemented in two versions.
The first one is implemented on top of Bro to be used on live traffic for real
time detection; it can also be used offline on PCAP files. The second version
is built in Python to be used offline on saved alerts’ logs. The prediction
module PM makes use of Python and Matlab to achieve its functionality.
All blacklists of blacklist-based detection modules are automatically up-
dated based on different intelligence feeds at once. The MLAPT detec-
tion modules can generate eight events (alerts), send alert emails to RT
and write alerts information into specific logs. Those detection modules’
alerts are fed to the FCI correlation framework to be filtered, clustered,
and the 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 is calculated for each cluster. FCI can generate three types
of alerts: apt_full_scenario_alert, apt_sub_scenario_two_steps_alert
and apt_sub_scenario_three_steps_alert. FCI writes all the corre-
lated clusters along with the 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑑 of each cluster into the correla-
tion_dataset. Based on the correlation_dataset, the PM module prepares
machine_learning_dataset, applies different machine learning algorithms to
find the best model and saves the prediction model to be used by the network
security team.
All the MLAPT detection modules, apart from MDND, were able to
detect the malicious connections with a true positive rate (TPR) of 100%
and a false positive rate (FPR) of 0%. The MDND module was able to
detect the malicious domain connections with a TPR of 83% and FPR of
0%. In addition, all the MLAPT detection modules were able to detect and
report the malicious connections in real time. Regarding the FCI correlation
framework, among all studied APTs, the best TPR results were for the APT
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sub-attack two steps scenario with a value of 94%, followed by the APT sub-
attack three steps scenario with a value of 84% and APT full attack with
a value of 78%, respectively. MLAPT was able to detect the APT attacks
with a TPR of 81.8% and FPR of 4.5%. The APT prediction module, built
based on the Linear SVM algorithm, has a prediction accuracy of 84.8%.
For future work, a number of improvements within the system could be
made. First, it is suggested that more detection modules are added to detect
other techniques used in the APT attack life cycle. Furthermore, if MLAPT
were able to monitor the internal network traffic, other detection modules
could be added to dtect brute force and pass the hash attacks, increasing
the detectable steps of the the system. Second, it is also recommended
that more than one detection module for the same technique are developed.
Third, it is advised that alerts from external IDSs deployed on the network
are received and fed to MLAP, which can reduce the false positive rate of the
system. Fourth, MLAP detection modules were evaluated on real traffic and
pcap files contain real attacks. However, the FCI framework was validated
on synthetic data. Therefore, it would be beneficial to test MLAP on real
APTs. Nevertheless, obtaining such data is not easy, and the lack of relevant
publicly available data sources was the main reason for using the synthetic
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